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Abstract  
 
The main purpose of this research is to analyze the impact of different public 
policies on the Brazilian labor market using rigorous econometric techniques to study the 
Brazilian public sector. A clear theoretical and empirical comprehension is crucial when 
designing policies to mitigate social problems, as well-intentioned policies may 
exacerbate the original problems if they are not correctly designed. The first chapter of 
this research studies the impact on the labor market of a public Social Security system 
that provides disability insurance benefits. This study searches for possible worker 
incentives to leave the labor force temporarily by comparing workers with the same 
health. Additionally, this study analyzes the extent to which workers with poor health 
continue to work because they lack social security coverage. I analyze the Brazilian 
disability insurance system, searching for possible incentives created by the system. The 
empirical analysis will be based on the system’s rule that only formal-economy workers 
are covered, taking advantage of the considerable proportion of workers in informal jobs 
in the Brazilian labor market; however, as formalized workers may differ in other ways 
from workers in the informal sector, the approach will account for this heterogeneity. The 
results reveal that workers in the formal sector are more likely to take leave, even after 
controlling for health. This difference reveals the effects of such social protection 
systems on the labor market and, at the same time, reveals the inequality in opportunities 
faced by informal-sector workers. Moreover, as having a formal job does not affect 
workers’ behavior when they have health problems, significant differences in the number 
of workers that take leave in the formal and informal sectors are not explained by 
differences in health status among these workers. The second chapter of this research 
studies the effect of a series of changes to the Brazilian old-age pension on child labor 
and school enrollment. Child labor is still a considerable problem in Brazilian society. 
This article analyzes the impact of the 1991 reform of the Brazilian rural pension system 
on child labor, literacy and school attendance. The 1991 social-security reform represents 
a good opportunity to investigate how income is allocated between household members 
because the reform generated an exogenous income shock: it decreased the minimum age 
for old-age pension eligibility and substantially increased the value of the minimum 
benefit. A significant proportion of Brazilian households, especially in rural areas, are 
composed of a mix of adults, children and elderly family members. Therefore, any 
changes in social-security benefits and eligibility rules may affect not only the 
beneficiaries but the other household members, as well. The results reveal an 
improvement in the educational attainments of children living with eligible males. 
Moreover, eligible females helped their grandchildren to leave the labor market in cases 
of child labor and facilitated their granddaughters’ educations. The analysis of the impact 
on different socioeconomic levels shows that the impacts are concentrated in the lowest 
socioeconomic quintile. In contrast to what is found in the literature, our estimates 
suggest that men dedicate their additional income to their granddaughters’ educations. 
One possible explanation is that men and women have different bargaining powers inside 
the family. There is evidence that the presence of female heads of household explain why 
eligible females appear to favor their granddaughter’s education and to favor their 
grandsons in cases of child labor. The third chapter recognizes the importance of 
education to the future of the children’s performance in the labor market; therefore, this 
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study analyzes the impact of teacher quality on children’s school performance. The 
reform of the public education system has played a major role in policy debates in Brazil 
over the last several years, especially after the universalization of standardized student-
achievement evaluations. The disappointing performance of students on language and 
mathematics tests and the gap between students from public and private schools on most 
measures of academic achievement are source of concern to parents and policymakers, 
increasing the pressure to restructure the entire system. Nearly everyone involved in 
education recognizes the importance of teacher quality to student achievement; however, 
little is known about how teachers affect different kinds of students. This lack of 
knowledge is especially worrying when the public school system implements 
accountability programs, using student achievement in teacher assessments and putting 
pressure for achievement-related accountability on individual teachers and schools. The 
measure of the impact of teacher quality on students is not straightforward, as we cannot 
simply compare groups of students from different teachers. Aside from teacher quality, 
the school performance of a group of students would depend on (i) the starting 
knowledge levels of students, (ii) their endowments (abilities and family backgrounds), 
and (iii) the teacher’s working conditions (for example, the school’s infrastructure). 
Therefore, the objective of this empirical analysis is to obtain estimates of differences in 
teacher contributions to student learning that account for the major sources of possible 
confounding from student heterogeneity and teacher assignment practices.  The results 
reveal that low-achieving students exposed to better-quality teachers would expect to 
achieve higher standard deviations higher in Portuguese and mathematics test-score 
performances. At the same time, high achieving students have Portuguese and 
mathematics scores increased when exposed to better quality teachers; however, such 
impact represents a larger proportion of the average test score gains for high-achieving 
students. Moreover, if we analyze the impact of teachers on different students inside the 
same classroom, we also observe that students in the top of the test score distribution 
benefit more from better quality teachers. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
The main purpose of this research is to analyze the impact of different public 
policies on the Brazilian labor market using rigorous econometric techniques to study the 
Brazilian public sector. A clear theoretical and empirical comprehension is crucial when 
designing policies to mitigate social problems, as well-intentioned policies may 
exacerbate the original problems if they are not correctly designed. 
The first part of the research analyzes the impact of certain characteristics of 
Social Security on various aspects of the Brazilian labor market. An understanding of the 
worker incentives created by Social Security benefits is critical to improving the design 
of the system. Moreover, knowledge of any positive externality created by Social 
Security benefits is essential to a complete understanding of the benefits that the system 
brings to society. 
The first chapter of this research studies the impact on the labor market of a 
public Social Security system that provides disability insurance benefits. This study 
searches for possible worker incentives to leave the labor force temporarily by comparing 
workers with the same health. Additionally, this study analyzes the extent to which 
workers with poor health continue to work because they lack social security coverage. I 
analyze the Brazilian disability insurance system, searching for possible incentives 
created by the system. The empirical analysis will be based on the system’s rule that only 
formal-economy workers are covered, taking advantage of the considerable proportion of 
workers in informal jobs in the Brazilian labor market; however, as formalized workers 
may differ in other ways from workers in the informal sector, the approach will account 
for this heterogeneity. The results reveal that workers in the formal sector are more likely 
to take leave, even after controlling for health. This difference reveals the effects of such 
social protection systems on the labor market and, at the same time, reveals the inequality 
in opportunities faced by informal-sector workers. Moreover, as having a formal job does 
not affect workers’ behavior when they have health problems, significant differences in 
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the number of workers that take leave in the formal and informal sectors are not 
explained by differences in health status among these workers. 
The second chapter of this research studies the effect of a series of changes to the 
Brazilian old-age pension on child labor and school enrollment. Child labor is still a 
considerable problem in Brazilian society. In 2001, 6.2% of children aged 5 to 14 years 
worked; however, this number jumps to 18.4% if we consider only children in rural areas. 
In addition, as the literature on child labor reveals, there are substantial consequences in 
terms of educational attainment for children prematurely involved in the labor market. 
This article analyzes the impact of the 1991 reform of the Brazilian rural pension system 
on child labor, literacy and school attendance. The 1991 social-security reform represents 
a good opportunity to investigate how income is allocated between household members 
because the reform generated an exogenous income shock: it decreased the minimum age 
for old-age pension eligibility and substantially increased the value of the minimum 
benefit. A significant proportion of Brazilian households, especially in rural areas, are 
composed of a mix of adults, children and elderly family members. Therefore, any 
changes in social-security benefits and eligibility rules may affect not only the 
beneficiaries but the other household members, as well. The empirical analysis uses a 
difference-in-difference estimator to identify the impact of the reform, where children 
affected by the reform (the treatment group) are compared with children not affected by 
the reform (the control group) before and after the reform. The results reveal an 
improvement in the educational attainments of children living with eligible males. 
Moreover, eligible females helped their grandchildren to leave the labor market in cases 
of child labor and facilitated their granddaughters’ educations. The analysis of the impact 
on different socioeconomic levels shows that the impacts are concentrated in the lowest 
socioeconomic quintile. In contrast to what is found in the literature, our estimates 
suggest that men dedicate their additional income to their granddaughters’ educations. 
One possible explanation is that men and women have different bargaining powers inside 
the family. There is evidence that the presence of female heads of household explain why 
eligible females appear to favor their granddaughter’s education and to favor their 
grandsons in cases of child labor. 
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The second part of the research recognizes the importance of education to the 
future of the children’s performance in the labor market; therefore, this study analyzes the 
impact of teacher quality on children’s school performance. The reform of the public 
education system has played a major role in policy debates in Brazil over the last several 
years, especially after the universalization of standardized student-achievement 
evaluations. The disappointing performance of students on language and mathematics 
tests and the gap between students from public and private schools on most measures of 
academic achievement are source of concern to parents and policymakers, increasing the 
pressure to restructure the entire system. Nearly everyone involved in education 
recognizes the importance of teacher quality to student achievement; however, little is 
known about how teachers affect different kinds of students. This lack of knowledge is 
especially worrying when the public school system implements accountability programs, 
using student achievement in teacher assessments and putting pressure for achievement-
related accountability on individual teachers and schools.   
The measure of the impact of teacher quality on students is not straightforward, as we 
cannot simply compare groups of students from different teachers. Aside from teacher 
quality, the school performance of a group of students would depend on (i) the starting 
knowledge levels of students, (ii) their endowments (abilities and family backgrounds), 
and (iii) the teacher’s working conditions (for example, the school’s infrastructure). 
Therefore, the objective of this empirical analysis is to obtain estimates of differences in 
teacher contributions to student learning that account for the major sources of possible 
confounding from student heterogeneity and teacher assignment practices.  The results 
reveal that low-achieving students exposed to better-quality teachers would expect to 
achieve 0.61 and 0.60 standard deviations higher in Portuguese and mathematics test-
score performances. At the same time, high achieving students have Portuguese and 
mathematics scores increased by 0.57 and 0.73 standard deviations when exposed to 
better quality teachers; however, such impact represents a larger proportion of the 
average test score gains for high-achieving students. Moreover, if we analyze the impact 
of teachers on different students inside the same classroom, we also observe that students 
in the top of the test score distribution benefit more from better quality teachers. 
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Chapter 1 
Impact of a Social Security System with Disability Insurance Coverage on 
the Labor Market 
 
Priscila Pereira Deliberalli 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Disability insurance is an important segment of any modern Social Security 
system, providing workers with benefits when poor health prevents them from working. 
Rules differ between countries, and every system creates different incentive structures for 
its participants. Such benefits are a significant achievement for any society; however, 
they create disincentives to participate in the labor force. There is no consensus among 
economists as to the magnitude of such impacts. This paper will examine Brazil’s 
disability insurance system, searching for system-created incentives to leave the labor 
force temporarily by comparing workers with the same health. Such questions become 
even more interesting because of the abrupt increase in the number of benefits in the 
Brazilian system that were claimed in the last decade, a phenomenon that raises several 
questions1. Better knowledge regarding the system’s incentive structures is crucial for a 
better management of the program.  
                                                 
1 There are some possible reasons, structural and non-structural, for such an increment in these benefits. 
They include (1) a government resolution which affected the rules on the screening process and the medical 
procedures to evaluate DI claims: INSS (Instituto Nacional de Seguridade Social) Resolution n.60/2001 in 
September of 2002 abolished the need to homologate medical exams and gave the power of the final 
decision to doctors, who now would not have to subject their decision-making process to anyone else. Even 
though Resolution n.60/2001 was revoked later that same month, the homologation of medical exams 
remained unnecessary. It remains to be seen if such an alteration in these operational rules represents an 
upgrade in the efficiency of the process, resulting in a faster provision of services, or if such resolution 
opened a hole in the legislation and allowed fraud and the granting of superfluous benefits; (2) the new 
Old-Age/Length of Contribution Benefit Formula (that created the “Fator Previdenciário”), which may 
have stimulated, after 1999, requirements of disability related benefits as an alternative source of income: 
Old-age benefits, now under new rules, would propitiate higher payments for those who retired later. The 
“Fator” rewarded (longer) years of contribution and resulted in a smaller replacement ratio relative to the 
previous replacement ratio of 100%. This possible explanation can be justified by the sharp difference in 
disability pension activity and by the change in the age-distribution of this kind of benefit after 1999. 
However, this is just speculation since there is no way to confirm that there was truly an intentional transfer 
from regular retirement benefits to disability ones. The only possible action to be taken to avoid the 
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Several researchers have sought to explain the interaction between social-
insurance programs and labor-force participation. Most of the literature on disability-
insurance (DI) disincentive effects focuses on the U.S. system, and the results are defined 
by the specific program. The different methodologies used in these studies significantly 
contributes to discussion of the problem; however, the usual methodology cannot be 
replicated to address the same issue in Brazil because the data are scarce. Moreover, the 
differences in program designs create different sets of incentives for the workers. 
For that reason, this paper will address this issue in a slightly different way to 
address another important and interesting question. This study will examine the impact of 
a public Social Security system that provides disability-insurance benefits to the labor 
force. The results suggest the magnitude of the disincentive created by such benefits. The 
empirical strategy will be based on the system’s coverage of only formal-sector workers 
and will take advantage of the considerate proportion of informal-economy workers in 
the Brazilian labor market. Therefore, this paper attempts to elucidate some of the 
possible disincentives created by the system by analyzing the differences between the 
behaviors of formal sector- and informal-sector workers, controlling for their health 
status. Moreover, this paper will analyze the extent to which the lack of coverage among 
informal-sector workers creates inequalities when workers in poor health are obliged to 
continue working. 
As only formal-sector workers benefit from the system, a comparison of the 
temporary job absences of formal and informal-sector workers with the same health could 
signal that DI benefits encourage workers to temporarily leave the job market; however, 
formal and informal-sector workers cannot be directly compared to each other, as they 
have different characteristics. To account for this heterogeneity, we use propensity-score 
estimates to compare workers with the same probability of being in the formal sector 
based on demographic, labor-sector and occupation characteristics.  
Moreover, we consider counterfactual estimates to explain the abrupt increase in 
new disability benefits after 2001. The aim is to determine the extent to which the 
                                                                                                                                                 
granting of unnecessary disability pensions is to improve the medical investigation procedure, an action 
crucial to develop the system as a whole. Concerned with this problem, the Brazilian government attempted 
to introduce some marginal reforms on the bureaucratic concession process trying to increase efficiency of 
the system, since deeper reforms on social security are a political challenge to any government (Deliberalli 
(2004)). 
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changes in individuals’ characteristics could explain the changes in the number of new DI 
benefits. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the Brazilian Social 
Security disability system and includes some statistics that help to illustrate the current 
situation and the motivation behind this study. Section 3 presents a literature review 
describing how the topic has been analyzed by other researchers. The next two sections 
describe the data and methodology employed to address the issue. The sixth section 
presents results suggesting that formal-sector workers, covered by the system, tend to be 
“on leave” (taking advantage of disability insurance) more frequently than informal-
sector workers. The last section summarizes the conclusions. 
 
1.2 Disability Insurance Benefits: Rules of the System 
 
The disability program in the Brazilian pension system includes three main 
classes of benefits: sickness benefits, disability pensions and occupational-injury benefits, 
which include a sickness benefit, a disability pension and an accident-compensation 
benefit. Moreover, the law guarantees rehabilitation for totally or partially disabled 
beneficiaries and rehabilitation for handicapped workers2. 
Workers become eligible for the sickness benefit if any ailment results in the 
inability to work. Payment starts after 16 days of absence or after the date the benefit was 
claimed if there are more than 30 days difference between this date and the beginning of 
the period of absence. The first 15 days of absence are paid by the employee. The vesting 
period is 12 months, and the benefit corresponds to 91% of the “salário-de-benefício”3. 
                                                 
2 The law guarantees rehabilitation for totally or partially incapable beneficiaries and habilitation to 
handicapped workers. This includes the supply of prosthesis and other instruments that could attenuate the 
loss of capacity or mobility. In order to relocate and guarantee the participation of disabled workers in the 
labor market. Moreover, the government requires that firms with more than 100 employees fill between 2% 
and 5%, depending on the number of employees, of their labor force with disabled and rehabilitated 
workers. However, it is necessary to investigate to what extent this rule is obeyed by the firms and what the 
penalties are for non-compliance. 
 
3 “Salário-de-benefício” is the base for all of the benefits of the social security system in Brazil. For 
disability benefits, “salário-de-benefício” is the average of the highest 80% of wages/remuneration since 
July 1994. The government is trying to change this formula for some disability related benefits, as will be 
discussed later. However, nothing has been approved by congress yet. It is worth mentioning that all of the 
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No maximum period of payment for this benefit is specified by law, although it is 
considered temporary. 
Workers become eligible for the disability pension if they are considered 
incapable of activities to guarantee financial viability and are unsuitable for 
rehabilitation. As in the sickness benefit, employees pay the first 15 days of absence. The  
payment starts after the end of the sickness benefit. If there was no previous sickness 
benefit, the payment starts after 16 days of absence or after the date the benefit was 
claimed if there are more than 30 days’ difference between this date and the beginning of 
the period of absence. The vesting period is 12 months, and the benefit corresponds to 
100% of the “salário-de-benefício”. Moreover, the benefit value is supplemented by 25% 
if the beneficiary requires constant personal care. 
The system of occupational-injury benefits includes a sickness benefit, a disability 
pension and an accident-compensation benefit. For the first two kinds of benefit, the 
payments are calculated the same way as described before. There is, however, no vesting 
period for work-related benefits. Workers become eligible for the accident-compensation 
benefit if work-related accidents result in diminished work capacity. This benefit is 
independent of any other remuneration and starts after the end of the sickness benefit 
payments. The benefit corresponds to 50% of the “salário-de-benefício” and cannot be 
paid when the worker is receiving any kind of retirement/disability pension (but it is 
added to the wage when retirement is calculated). 
This paper focuses on sickness benefits (occupationally related or otherwise). In 
the standard terminology, these are disability-insurance (DI) benefits.  
As informal workers do not have any legal rights, their ability to take leave would 
depend on the kind of job they do or on the generosity of the employer. For example, a 
self-employed informal worker may temporarily stop working, but only at the expense of 
his own “wage” or revenue. On the other hand, a maid that works informally but with a 
relatively generous family4 may take leave if she gets sick and still be paid by her 
employers; however, neither has any legal rights or government protection. 
                                                                                                                                                 
benefits are inflation-indexed and updated once a year using the National Consumer Price Index (INPC). 
Furthermore, there is a bottom limit for the benefits to equal at least the minimum wage. 
4 Not generous enough to hire her as a formal worker. 
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Two kinds of social protection networks that are available in Brazil to those who 
never contributed to Social Security, but neither relates to unemployment insurance or 
disability insurance. The first network is a conditional cash-transfer program (Bolsa 
Familia) that transfers resources to families with children. The amount transferred 
depends on the number of children and their ages, with a maximum total benefit value 
approaching ½ minimum wage. To be eligible, family per-capita income must be less 
than ¼ minimum wage. Informal workers who can rely on that benefit would have more 
advantage if they get sick and decide to take leave compared to those workers that do not 
have access to this benefit. At the same time, that program is available to any lower-
income family with children, meaning that formal-sector workers also have access; 
however, considering the average income of workers in the formal and informal sector, it 
is unlikely that most workers eligible for “Bolsa Familia” work in the formal sector. 
Therefore, this benefit would likely increase the probability that informal workers will 
take leave, lessening the impacts we find in this paper.  
The second social protection network available to informal workers is called 
LOAS (Social Assistance Benefit). Eligible workers (i) are 65 years or older, do not 
receive any other social security benefit, and have a per-capita income less than ¼ of 
minimum wage; or (ii) are permanently disabled, with a per-capita income lower than ¼ 
of minimum wage. As my study considers only employed workers (on leave ), workers 
that are already permanently disabled and out of the labor force are excluded; therefore, 
the LOAS would not influence the probability of their taking leave. 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
 
This section summarizes some studies on the disincentivizing effects of disability 
insurance (DI) in the U.S., describing the characteristics of this system. The main 
differences between the U.S. and the Brazilian system and the data availability will be 
emphasized to justify the methodology applied in this paper.  
Originally, the Social Security disability-insurance program (SSDI) in the U.S. 
was designed for workers suffering from impairment of continued and indefinite 
duration; however, in 1965, “the definition of disability was liberalized to allow those 
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without permanent disabilities to qualify”5. Eligibility is conditioned on previous 
sufficient employment in jobs covered by Social Security. Differences between the 
Brazilian and the U.S. system do not allow direct comparison of the results; however, the 
literature on the U.S. system suggests that some degree of disincentive is created by DI 
programs. This paper aims to analyze the extent to which the same disincentivization 
happens in Brazil. 
The major problem in identifying the disincentivizing effects of DI programs is 
the absence of information about the potential labor supply of beneficiaries. The main 
methodological problem faced by researchers when addressing these impacts on labor-
force participation (LFP) is the endogeneity of the DI benefits. Participation in DI 
programs is based on a combination of an individual’s decision to apply for the program 
and the individual’s eligibility for the program. Therefore, DI benefits cannot be treated 
as exogenous variable in a labor-force participation equation.   
To manage this endogeneity problem, several studies have tried to model LFP as a 
function of the potential benefit levels by wage, known as the replacement rate; however, 
this method presents certain problems, as well. Depending on the mechanism of benefit 
calculation, the replacement ratio may differ among workers with different wage levels 
and work histories. Thus, as benefits depend on past wages, they depend on past work 
decisions, as well, and the replacement rate cannot also be considered an exogenous 
variable. Moreover, the replacement rate combines wage and benefit levels, confounding 
their impacts on LFP. 
A series of studies has attempted to evaluate the work capability of DI claimants 
and measure the degree of disincentive attributed to DI programs in the U.S. Parson 
(1980) modeled labor-force participation as a function of replacement rates and 
demographic and health characteristics. This researcher compared the participation rates 
in labor forces with high and low replacement rates. The difference in participation rates 
between these two groups is taken to be an estimate of the DI disincentive; however, as 
mentioned before, this strategy does not consider the endogeneity of replacement ratios. 
As replacement ratios are a decreasing function of past earnings and incentive structure, it 
                                                 
5 Bound (1989). 
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is not possible to determine whether it was generous replacement rates or low earnings 
that induced individuals to leave the labor force. 
Bound (1989) suggested that there is a causal connection between the availability 
and generosity of DI benefits and the increasing proportion of older men leaving the labor 
force to qualify for the benefits; the proportion of older men out of the labor force 
increased as DI benefits grew rapidly due to the higher availability and generosity of the 
system. This estimation strategy considered rejected applicants as a control group for the 
beneficiaries. Bound assumed that rejected applicants are healthier and more capable of 
work than those who were accepted; therefore, their labor-force participation should 
provide an upper bound for what could be expected of DI beneficiaries. Bound found that 
fewer than 50% of rejected male applicants work and that less than half of those on DI 
would work were they not receiving benefits. 
As Autor and Duggan (2006) observed, this methodology may be biased towards 
underestimating the labor disincentive of the disability insurance system for two reasons: 
“some rejected applicants may remain out of labor force because they are reapplying for 
DI while other rejected applicants may be unable to find re-employment because their 
skills and opportunities deteriorated during the application process”. Another limitation is 
that low-skilled, but not disabled, workers who would not be working but who filled out 
applications distort this comparison between rejected and non-rejected claimants. 
Chen and Van der Klaauw (2006) evaluated the work-disincentive effects of DI 
programs in the 1990s. These researchers replicated the Bound upper bound for the work-
disincentive effect of the current program and subsequently adopted a Regression-
Discontinuity approach to provide a point estimate of the impact of the DI program on 
“marginal applicants who are not immediately awarded or denied benefits on the basis on 
their specific medical impairment and whose eligibility needs to be determined by 
considering vocational factors”. More specifically, exploiting the fact that for 
approximately 40% of applicants, disability determination was not resolved based on 
medical grounds, these researchers analyzed the particularities of the determination 
process that access the residual capacity of a worker based on the grid, causing a 
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discontinuity on the probability of being awarded depending on age6. As the individuals 
are of similar age when they are just below or above the cutoff age, those just below the 
cutoff age are comparable to the individuals just above it in all characteristics. 
Consequently, these individuals are expected to have similar labor-supply responses 
when receiving DI benefits. The authors held that the average LFP of individuals just 
below the cutoff age could be a credible estimate of what the LFP of those just above the 
cutoff would have been if they had not been awarded the DI benefit. Their estimates 
imply that “the LFP rate of DI beneficiaries would have been at most 20 percentage 
points higher had they not received benefits”, suggesting a smaller disincentive than the 
one estimated by Bound7.  
The U.S. and the Brazilian systems present several significant differences, 
resulting in diverse disincentive effects. The rules in the U.S. and the Brazilian Social 
Security systems differ, and the degrees of disincentive brought to the labor markets are 
different as well.  
The Brazilian screening process does not include as many steps to identify 
qualified applicants. The decision is based on health status and the capacity to carry out 
the worker’s “current” job. The fact that Brazilian rules require workers to be currently 
enrolled in jobs covered by Social Security represents a significant difference between 
                                                 
6 The U.S. disability determination process is based on medical and vocational factors such age, education 
and past employment, all used to determine an individual’s ability to work. After going through nonmedical 
criteria (to be eligible, individuals must be under 65—and now 67 for those born in 1960 or later—, must 
have worked for at least 5 of the last 10 years and cannot be “engaged in a substation gainful activity” (no 
more than $860 monthly earnings in 2006), severity assessment evaluates if an applicant has an impairment 
that meets a specific codified clinical criterion relating to both the nature and the severity of impairment, 
which defines benefit award. If a benefit is not awarded, the next step is to evaluate the applicant’s ability 
to work, based on his/her characteristics including health condition. If offices conclude that the applicant 
cannot work, then a benefit is awarded. Both the individual’s ability to perform the job he had before the 
onset of the disability and his residual functional capacity to work are evaluated. If he is considered able to 
perform his past job, the benefit is denied. If he is considered unable to perform his past job, than he moves 
onto the next stage, where the residual functional capacity determined before is combined with vocational 
characteristics such as age, education and work experience to determine if he can carry out alternative types 
of work in the economy, other than the one he had held. A grid is provided to help guide the decision. The 
grid regulations relate certain workers’ characteristics such as age, education and past work experience to 
the individuals’ residual capacity to perform work-related physical and mental activities. Individuals are 
characterized by different age groups (under 45, 45 to 49, 50 to 54, and 55 and over) and by different 
residual functional capacities (sedentary, light or medium) previously determined and based on medical 
condition, experience and skill level. If an applicant’s request is denied, it is possible to appeal. 
6 Several authors have discussed some potential reasons for the different results. For more detail, see 
reference. 
7 Several authors have discussed some potential reasons for the different results. For more detail, see 
reference. 
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the two systems. As a result, an evaluation of a worker’s residual capacity to work would 
suggest that an applicant leave a job he/she is unable to perform and find another suited 
to his/her potential. 
Two potential consequences of the design differences should be considered. First, 
because U.S. eligibility requirements are conditioned on the applicant’s not being 
engaged in any activity that is both “substantial and gainful”, the system could create 
higher incentives for non-labor participation; however, as the final step of the U.S. 
screening process is an assessment of the residual functional capacity, i.e., it verifies 
whether the applicant can carry out any type of work in the economy. For this reason, the 
U.S. system may grant benefits to truly disabled workers more frequently than does the 
Brazilian system. 
The strategies used by the papers just described could not be applied to analyze 
the disincentive effects of disability insurance in Brazil, due to insufficient data. 
Considering the availability of data in Brazil, this paper will address this issue in a 
slightly different way, but it will answer another important and interesting question. This 
paper will examine the impact of  a public Social Security system that provides disability-
insurance benefits on the probability of being “on leave”. The results suggest the 
magnitude of the disincentivizing effects of such benefits. The empirical strategy will be 
based on the system’s coverage of formal-sector workers alone. The analysis will take 
advantage of the considerable proportion of the Brazilian labor market that is informally 
employed. 
 
1.4 Data 
 
This paper uses data from the Brazilian Household Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por 
Amostras de Domicílios – PNAD) conducted by the Brazilian Census Bureau (Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – IBGE), which is an annual household survey with 
a sample size equal to 1/500 of the Brazilian population. We first use the 2003 survey, 
which includes a supplement about health. One of the greatest obstacles to be surpassed 
in addressing the problem of the DI disincentive as the literature does would be to 
identify workers receiving DI benefits, as no specific question identifies them on the 
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PNAD. Other Brazilian household surveys do contain such identification but do not 
contain sufficient information about labor-force participation. 
As mentioned previously, Social Security covers only formal-sector workers. In 
that sense, informal workers would provide a control group for formal-sector workers. 
Controlling for demographics, labor sectors, occupations and health, formal workers 
would have a smaller labor-force participation than informal workers if the DI benefit 
induces a degree of disincentive to return to the labor force or an incentive to leave it 
momentarily. For that reason, the comparison between formal and informal workers 
would bring some light to the discussion about the disincentives caused by DI benefits. 
The dependent variable comes from answering the following question: “Were you 
temporarily away from a paid job on the reference week?”8. The “treatment group” 
(formal-sector workers) includes workers who contribute to Social Security and are 
therefore eligible to the system. The health-condition dummy variables are based on a 
self-reported health-status variable. 
Using formal-sector workers rather than the actual beneficiaries as the “treatment 
group” (the “intent-to-treat” approach) helps to manage the endogeneity problem in 
studying the impact of DI benefits on the labor force. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, 
formal and informal workers cannot be directly compared to each other, as they have 
different characteristics; thus, this variable (dummy for a formal-sector worker) also 
cannot be considered exogenous, rendering the estimates inconsistent. The chosen 
methodology will mitigate this problem as described below. 
The sample includes employed private-sector workers in non-rural employment. 
Rural workers were excluded because most of them have no formal job positions. 
Furthermore, as rural workers tend to have specific characteristics like low education 
levels, using these individuals in the sample could bias the results. Public sector workers 
were also excluded, as they work under a specific Social Security regime that differs 
from the private-sector regime. 
                                                 
8 Only people who previously declared themselves as employed had the opportunity to answer this 
question. 
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Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of the sample of formal- and informal-
9 sector workers. As would be expected, formal- and informal-sector workers differ in 
almost all demographic and occupational characteristics. Workers enrolled in formal jobs 
are mainly married white men, are more educated than informal workers, live in the 
South and Southeast, and perform jobs in the manufacturing, health and education 
sectors. 
Workers who declared themselves to be in excellent health belonged mostly to the 
formal sector. On the other hand, workers who declared themselves to be in normal, poor 
or very poor health worked mainly in the informal sector. Interestingly, approximately 
6.6% of informal workers declared that they did not undertake some activity on the week 
before the survey for health reasons, while among formal-sector workers, only 5.1% 
reported such limitations. In contrast, only 0.97% of informal workers (versus 2.5% of 
formal workers) were “on leave” in the reference week. 
We used the 1998 PNAD10 to estimate counterfactual probabilities. The aim is to 
characterize the extent to which the changes in individuals’ characteristics from 1998 to 
2003 could explain the increase in the number of new disability-insurance benefits.  
 Moreover, the estimation of difference-in-difference estimates between the 1998 
and 2003 data will show that the identification strategy (using formal-sector workers as 
the “treatment group” and informal-sector workers as the “control group”) can capture 
the considerable increase in the number of disabilities benefits between these two 
periods. 
 
 1.5 Empirical Strategy and Methodology 
 
Differences in the labor market, program design and data availability require an 
alternative methodology to examine the disincentivizing effects of DI programs. This 
requirement will compromise any result comparisons with the previous literature for the 
U.S. system; however, it will contribute to the discussion of disincentive effects of DI 
benefits. 
                                                 
9 We defined formal sector workers as those who contribute to Social Security (called INSS in Brazil). 
10 The 1998 PNAD includes a health supplement as well. 
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The same endogeneity issues inherent in the analysis of DI disincentive effects 
complicate this analysis; unobserved attributes that make job formality more likely may 
be correlated with LFP (in this paper, a binary variable that measures temporary labor-
force absence or the probability of being “on leave”). Therefore, a single-equation 
estimate of the effect of a formal job on LFP (equation (1)) would be biased. The 
likelihood of being a formal-sector worker (ti = 1) is probably correlated with variables 
(Xs) that influence the LFP or the probability of being “on leave”. 
 
LFPi = α + βXi + γti + εi   (1) 
 
To mitigate the potential bias due to unobserved heterogeneity (between treatment 
and control groups) and endogeneity problems, Rosembaum and Rubin (1983) developed 
the propensity-score-matching estimators. In this method, each treatment unit (covered or 
formal-sector workers) is matched with non-treatment units (non-covered or informal-
sector workers) under the assumption of conditional independence, i.e., LFPi ┴ ti / Xi and 
common support, i.e., 0 < Prob(ti = 1 / Xi) < 1, (Mocan and Tekin, 2002). The propensity-
score method is used to control for the differences between the treatment and control 
groups. Therefore, we guarantee that comparisons are made between homogeneous 
workers; after controlling for the observed characteristics (Xs), assignment to treatment and 
control groups would be random. 
Each formal-sector worker (treated unit) can be matched with an informal-sector 
worker (control unit), and the average treatment effect is calculated as the mean within-
match difference in the outcome variable (probability of being “on leave”) between 
treated and non-treated observations.  
The idea behind this propensity-score method is that conditional independence 
and common-support assumptions imply that “whereas one conditional on X in 
traditional matching estimators, in propensity score matching estimators one conditions 
on the propensity score because observations with the same propensity score have the 
same distribution of covariates, X” (Mocan and Tekin, 2002). Therefore: 
 
LFPi ┴ ti / p(Xi) and 0 < Prob(ti = 1 /p( Xi)) < 1 
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The first step in the method is the estimation of a probit regression to estimate the 
propensity score. “Rosembaum and Rubin (1983) define a propensity score as a function 
of the vector X, such that Xi ┴ ti / p(Xi), i.e., conditional on the propensity score, the 
covariates are independent of assignment to treatment” (Mocan and Tekin, 2002). 
Therefore, the distribution of the variables in vector X should be the same across treated 
and non-treated individuals for observations with the same propensity score (the Balance 
Property). The idea behind this method considers that the bias is reduced when 
comparing treated and non-treated individuals that are as alike as possible. The extent to 
which the bias is eliminated depends on the quality of the control variables used when 
estimating the propensity score. 
The second step involves the estimation of the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT). Following (Mocan and Tekin, 2002), the ATT estimation can be specified 
as follows: 
 
E(Δi / ti = 1)    = E{(LFPi = 0, LFPi = 1) / ti = 1}  
= E{E{(LFPi = 0, LFPi = 1) / ti = 1, p(Xi)}} 
  = E{E{LFPi = 1 / ti = 1, p(Xi)}} – E{E{LFPi = 0 / ti = 1, p(Xi)}} 
 
The empirical strategy in this paper estimates the probability of LFPi = 1 (in this 
context, probability of worker being “on leave”) among workers with a similar propensity 
score (in this paper, the probability of working in a formal job). Five groups were defined 
based on the estimated probability of being a formal-sector worker. Accordingly, for 
workers in each of these five groups, the probability of being “on leave” was estimated as 
follows: 
 
Prob (on leave)ij = αj + βZij + γtij + εij ,  (2) 
 
where vector Z contains health-condition variables. Equation (2) estimates the 
probability of a worker being “on leave” for workers with the same propensity (j = 1, …, 
5), the impact of having a formal job and the impact of coverage by the DI program. Each 
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of the j equations estimated considers workers with a similar propensity. To determine 
the consistency of the estimates, we estimated the probability of being “on leave” for j = 
1, …, 10, as well. 
Next, to confirm the findings above, the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATT) will be measured using Nearest-Neighbor Matching (NNM) estimators; as p(X) is 
a continuous variable, there are no two individuals with the same p(X). The NNM 
estimator will take each treated unit and search for the nearest control unit, i.e., the 
control unit with the closest p(X). Once treated and control units are matched, the 
difference between the treated and control outcomes is computed. The ATT is the 
average of all these differences (Becker and Ichino (2002)). 
The results will show that the estimates may still be biased, as the Balance 
Property is not totally satisfied, even though treatment and control groups are more 
similar when considering individuals with the same propensity score.  
The next step is to run the counterfactual decomposition method developed by 
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), which is employed to analyze the mean outcome 
differences between workers in 1998 and 2003. The idea is to observe the extent to which 
the changes in individuals’ attributes from 1998 to 2003 could explain the changes in the 
number of new disability-insurance benefits. Again, our dependent variable is a dummy 
that captures whether a worker is “on leave”, as we do not have information concerning 
who receives the benefit. 
Following Jann (2008), consider our outcome variable Y (dummy equals one if 
worker is on leave). The question is how much of the difference between E(Y1998) and 
E(Y2003) is explained by differences in individual characteristics between these two 
groups of workers. Therefore, the method divides the differences in the probability of 
being “on leave” between workers in 1998 and 2003 in into group characteristics and a 
residual that is not accounted for by such characteristics. Suppose we estimate the model 
below: 
 
Yg = Xg’βg + eg  where g = 1998, 2003  E(eg) = 0 
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The mean outcome difference can be expressed as the difference between the 
E(Yg) for each group: 
 
R = E(Y1998) – E(Y2003) = E(X1998)’ β1998 – E(X2003)’ β2003   as E(eg) = 0 
 
R = [E(X1998) – E(X2003)]’ β2003 + E(X2003)’(β1998 – β2003 ) + [E(X1998) – E(X2003)]’ (β1998 – β2003 ) 
 
Therefore, the outcome difference can be divided into three parts: 
 
R = E + C + I, 
 
where  
 
E = [E (X1998) – E (X2003)]’ β2003 is the “endowment effect” and shows the part of the 
differential explained by group differences in the independent variables   
C = E (X2003)’(β1998 – β2003 ) is the part of the differential explained by coefficient 
differences among the two groups 
I = [E(X1998) – E(X2003)]’ (β1998 – β2003 ) “is an interaction term accounting for the fact 
that differences in endowment and coefficients exist simultaneously between the two 
groups” (Jann, 2008) 
 
The model estimated is as follows: 
 
E (on leave) = α + βX + γt + ε,    
 
where t represents the dummy variable for workers in the formal sector, and X includes 
socioeconomics characteristics and health status characteristics. 
 
1.6 Results 
 
As there are no data for which we can identify the actual benefit recipients, this 
paper will employ an intent-to-treat approach, where the actual treatment will be replaced 
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by eligibility for participation in the system. Another positive aspect of such an approach 
is that it avoids the selectivity problem. Therefore, the first step is to estimate the 
probability of receiving treatment, i.e., to be eligible to receive the benefit, as is the case 
for all workers who contribute to Social Security (called INSS in Brazil). We will call 
these eligible individuals “formal workers”. 
To obtain the values of the propensity to work in the formal sector, the first step 
was to estimate probits for the whole sample and separately for men and women as a 
function of their other demographic and labor-market characteristics. Table 2 shows that 
all these variables turned out to be significant to the determination of the probability of 
being a formal worker11. As expected, workers with a higher likelihood of being formal-
sector workers are more likely to be educated, white, living in metropolitan areas and 
employed in the manufacturing, health and education sectors. Based on these results, 
workers were classified into five groups according to the estimated probabilities of 
working in a formal-sector job (or their propensity scores). To check the consistency of 
the estimates, workers were grouped into ten different blocks, as well, based on the same 
probabilities. 
Graphs 1, 1a and 1b show that once we separate workers based on the estimated 
probability of being in the formal sector, the probability density function of informal 
workers approaches the density function of formal workers, especially for workers in the 
lower and upper tails of the distribution. 
The next step in assessing the effect of Social Security on the LFP is to estimate 
the impact of a formal-sector job in the probability of being “on leave” among workers 
with the same likelihood of being formal-sector workers. The Balance Property requires 
that the distribution of the exogenous variables be the same across formal (treated) and 
informal (non-treated) sector workers for individuals with the same propensity score. 
Table 4 reveals that even though treatment and control groups (formal and informal 
workers) are different with respect to demographic and labor characteristics, once we 
consider individuals with the same propensity score, these differences decrease 
considerably.  
                                                 
11 This excludes variables like “other occupation” and “public administration sector” as few individuals 
present such characteristics.  
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Table 5 shows the estimated probability of being “on leave”, controlling for 
workers’ health. Tables 5a and 5b display a similar estimation for women and men 
separately. They reveal the impact created by the disability system; among workers with 
the same likelihood of being in the formal sector, those in formal jobs have a higher 
probability of being “on leave”. Considering the entire sample, Table 5 shows that 
workers eligible for the system have a probability of being temporarily absent from their 
jobs 0.47 points higher than that of workers who are not eligible for the system, even 
after controlling for health status. As discussed before, however, workers from formal 
and informal sectors have different demographic characteristics; therefore, these 
differences could explain such result; however, after separating workers based on the 
probability of being in the formal sector, we find similar results. For the five different 
groups defined by the probability of being a formal worker, having a formal job increases 
the probability of being “on leave” by more than 0.4 points (0.35 to 0.51, depending on 
the likelihood of being in the formal sector). If we increase the similarity of workers 
inside each group based on the probability of working as a formal worker and increase 
the number of groups from five to ten, the results are maintained12. 
It is worth mentioning that workers in poor health have a much smaller 
probability of being “on leave” if they have a low likelihood of being in the formal 
sector. Better health, as expected, seems to decrease the probability of being “on leave”, 
especially for men; however, as the health variable is a self-reported health, it seems that 
there is no difference between individuals that declared themselves as being in “really 
good health” and “good health”.  
Tables 5a and 5b include estimates for females and males separately; again, we 
find that workers eligible for the benefit have higher a probability of being on leave. The 
impact for eligible females with the lowest probability of being in the formal sector is 
almost twice as high as the impact for the other groups of females, revealing that 
uneducated females with low-skilled jobs tend to take fuller advantage of such benefits 
than highly educated women in managerial positions. Conversely, male workers in the 
same group (lower probability of being in the formal sector) do not have a higher 
                                                 
12 We do not find significant results among workers in the top of the distribution of the probability of being 
in the formal sector in the case (Prob(formal) > 0.9). Results upon request. 
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probability of being on leave than do men in different groups. Applying nearest-neighbor 
matching estimators, we find smaller but still significant results (Table 6). 
The results suggest that it is necessary to increase the formality of the Brazilian 
labor market such that individuals whose health would prevent them from working do not 
continue to work. On the other hand, although increasing the proportion of formal jobs is 
desirable, the considerable increase in the granting of new DI benefits after 200113 
suggests that the granting rules might be creating unwanted incentives for people to 
temporarily leave the labor force. 
To test the quality of the dependent variable that indicates whether workers are 
temporarily absent from their jobs, we run the same estimates using a different dependent 
variable14 that reveals whether a worker did not undertake any regular activity due to 
health problems. As this question does not focus on job-related activities (and therefore 
would not necessarily involve any benefit payment in case of an affirmative answer), we 
should not expect any difference between formal- and informal-sector workers after 
controlling for health characteristics. In fact, we observe no significant impact of having 
a formal sector job on the probability of quitting any activity for health reasons. 
Moreover, if we consider a dependent variable that consider workers “on leave” and who 
avoided any regular activity due to health problems, we find stronger effects (coefficients 
are higher). We expect that the probability of taking leave for health reasons should be 
significantly different between formal and informal workers if informal workers feel 
unable to stop working due to the lack of benefits coverage; see Appendix for results. 
Therefore, as we do not find that having a formal job affects workers’ behavior when 
they have health problems, the significant differences in the number of workers that take 
leave in the formal and informal sector are not explained by differences in health status 
among these workers. 
It is worth remembering that there was a significant increase in the number of new 
disability benefits after 2001. The identification strategy employed in the paper is able to 
capture this movement, what we can see in Table 7, which shows the difference in 
difference estimate of the change in the impact of being a formal-sector worker in the 
                                                 
13 As mentioned before, it is not clear what caused such an abrupt increase in the number of benefits. 
However, some changes in the granting rules seem to have contributed to such fact. 
14 This variable comes from the Health Supplement. 
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probability of being “on leave”. Calling 2003 observations “Post”, we observe that after 
controlling for the time trend and treatment (formal workers), the variable “Post x 
Treatment” (difference in difference estimate) is significant in explaining the LFP. 
Although it is not possible to point to the specific reason for such an increase in the 
number of disability benefits (as we briefly discussed before), the identification strategy 
(intend-to-treat approach) seems to illustrate this point.  
Table 8 presents the counterfactual probability estimates. The first part of the 
table reveals that the probability of being “on leave” is 0.64 percentage points smaller in 
1998. The first line of the second part of table reflects the mean decrease in the 
probability of being “on leave” if 2003 workers had 1998 workers’ characteristics. 
Differences in endownment account for approximately 13% of the differential (-0.08 of -
0.64). The second line reflects the changes in the probability of being “on leave” if we 
apply 1998 worker coefficients to the 2003 worker characteristics. Approximately 86% of 
the probability difference among 1998 and 2003 workers is explained by such coefficient 
differences (-0.55 of -0.64). The third part measures the impact of differences in 
endownment and coefficients (the interaction term), but such effect is not significant. 
Therefore, individual characteristics changes are not able to explain all of the 
considerable increases in the granting of new DI benefits after 2001. 
 
1.7 Conclusions 
 
This study took advantage of the high proportion of informal-sector workers, 
uncovered by Social Security, to analyze the impact of such system on the labor force 
participation of Brazilian workers. After controlling for the demographic and labor 
market characteristics, informal-sector workers would be a control group for formal-
sector workers covered by Social Security. The identification strategy employed in the 
paper is able to capture the strong increase in the number of new DI benefits observed in 
the Brazilian economy after 2001. 
To manage the endogeneity of the variable that separates formal and informal-
sector workers in a single labor-force-participation (LFP) equation estimation, the 
probability of being “on leave” was estimated separately for workers with the same 
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propensity to work in a formal-sector job. Although the Balanced Property cannot be 
totally satisfied, we can considerably reduce the heterogeneity between the treatment and 
control groups by estimating the treatment effect for individuals with the same propensity 
score.  
The results reveal that workers in the formal sector have a higher probability of 
being “on leave”, even after controlling for health, which suggests the degree of 
disincentive created by such social protection system. At the same time, workers with 
poor health have a higher probability of working if they in the informal sector. Moreover, 
as we do not find that having a formal job affects workers’ behavior when they have 
health problems, the significant differences in the number of workers that take leave in 
the formal and informal sector are not explained by differences in health status among 
these workers. 
Providing workers with benefits when sickness prevents them from working is an 
important role of any modern Social Security system. However, even though  such 
benefits are an important achievement for any society, some benefit structures may create 
disincentives to participate in the labor force. This paper suggests either that workers 
from the formal sector may take advantage of the system to be “on leave” from their jobs, 
even when their health statuses do not require that they do so; the results also suggest that 
it is necessary to increase the formality of the Brazilian labor market such that individuals 
whose health is too poor to work are not forced to continue working; however, as some 
small granting-rule modifications seem to have caused an abrupt increase in the number 
of new DI benefits, we believe that the design of the system can be improved to avoid 
creating undesired incentives. 
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Chapter 2 
Old-Age Benefits and Income Bargaining Effects on Child Labor and 
Education in Brazil 
 
Priscila Pereira Deliberalli 
Vladimir Ponczek 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This paper studies the effect of a series of changes to the Brazilian old-age 
pension on child labor and school enrollment. Child labor is still a considerable problem 
in Brazilian society. In 2001, 6.2% of children aged 5 to 14 years worked; however, this 
number increases to 18.4% if we consider only children in rural areas15. In addition, as 
the literature on child labor reveals, there are substantial consequences in terms of 
educational attainment for children prematurely involved in the labor market16. 
This article will analyze the impact of the 1991 reform of the Brazilian rural 
pension system on child labor, literacy and school attendance. The 1991 social-security 
reform decreased the minimum age for old-age pension eligibility and substantially 
increased the value of the minimum benefit. Before the reform, there was a flat old-age 
benefit (equal to half the minimum wage) for rural areas, and only one member of the 
household was eligible (usually the head). The minimum eligibility age was 65 years for 
men and 60 years for women. After the reform, more than one family member could be 
eligible for benefits, and the minimum benefit value was set equal to minimum wage. The 
minimum eligibility age for old-age benefits was reduced to 60 years for men and 55 
years for women.  
A significant proportion of Brazilian households, especially in rural areas, are 
formed of a mix of adults, children and elderly members. Therefore, any changes in 
social-security benefits and eligibility rules may affect not only the beneficiaries but the 
                                                 
15 Brazil National Labor Survey (SIMPOC) (2001) in Brazil: Child Labor Data Country Brief (2008) ILO 
16 There are different views regarding the impact of child labor on education. The literature review section 
will discuss this causal relationship in detail. 
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other household members, as well. Hence, the 1991 reform represents a good opportunity 
to investigate how income is allocated among household members, as the reform 
generated an exogenous income shock. If we consider that the intra-household allocation 
model is not uniform and that each agent may behave differently, the changes in the 
eligibility rules and benefit amounts would have an impact different from any other 
ordinary income shock if the preferences of the elderly are not the same as those of the 
other adults in the household. The empirical strategy considers a difference-in-difference 
estimator to identify the impact of the reform, where children affected by the reform (the 
treatment group) are compared with children not affected by the reform (the control 
group) before and after the reform; however, selectivity bias could occur because the 
decision to apply for the benefit could be endogenous. To manage these issues, instead of 
creating the actual treatment group, an intent-to-treat group that considers all of the 
eligible elderly will be created. Additionally, families with elderly members may differ 
from families with no elderly members. Therefore, the treatment group is composed of 
members of households with an eligible elderly member (under the new and old rules of 
the system) and the control group is composed of members of households with elderly 
members who are not old enough to be eligible (men between 55 and 60 years, and 
women between 50 and 55 years). We believe that this strategy represents an important 
improvement over Carvalho (2000), as it can be used to build similar control and 
treatment groups, making our findings more robust and accounting for the heterogeneity 
between children living with an elderly member and children not living with one. The 
heterogeneity between the treatment group and such a control group could jeopardize the 
consistency of the estimation if it is not properly addressed.  
Aside from understanding the positive externalities that old-age benefits bring to 
society, the objective of this paper is to analyze the intuitive idea that child labor emerges 
from the poorest households; therefore, this paper studies the impact of changes to the 
Brazilian old-age pension on child labor and school attendance in families from different 
income quantiles and socioeconomic levels. The results would still contribute to 
knowledge of intra-household allocation models, as the findings would show whether an 
income shock targeting grandparents would affect resource allocation to children. Clear 
theoretical and empirical comprehension is crucial when designing policies to mitigate 
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the problem, as well-intentioned policies may exacerbate child poverty if they are not 
correctly designed.  
The results reveal improvement in the educational attainments of children living 
with eligible males. Moreover, eligible females helped their grandchildren to leave the 
labor market in cases of child labor and supported their granddaughters’ education. The 
analysis of the socioeconomic index shows that the impacts are concentrated in the 
lowest socioeconomic quintile. In opposition to the literature, our estimates suggest that 
men dedicate their additional income to the education of their granddaughters. One 
possible explanation is that men and women have different bargaining powers inside the 
family. The presence of female heads of household explains why eligible females seem to 
favor their granddaughter’s education and to favor their grandsons in cases of child labor. 
 
2.2 The Social Security Reform and Literature on the Impact of Income on Child 
Labor 
 
In 1988, the new federal constitution was approved in Brazil, instituting several 
changes to the entire social security system, such as equalization of rural and urban 
benefits; extension of old-age benefits to all family members; a mandate that no benefit 
should be smaller than the minimum wage; a reduction in the minimum age for old-age 
eligibility; and length-of-service eligibility for rural workers; however, as the new 
constitution stipulated, Congress should pass ordinary laws to implement these changes, 
as was performed on July 24, 199117. 
Before the reform, there was a flat old-age benefit (equal to half the minimum 
wage) for rural areas and only one member of the household was eligible (usually the 
head). The minimum age of eligibility was 65 years for men and 60 years for women. 
After the reform, more than one family member could be eligible for benefits and the 
minimum benefit value was set equal to the minimum wage. The minimum eligibility age 
for old-age benefits was reduced to 60 years for men and 55 years for women. Besides 
the old-age benefit, rural workers could apply to receive length-of-service benefits for 
                                                 
17 Laws n. 8212 and n. 8213, available at 
http://www81.dataprev.gov.br/sislex/paginas/42/1991/8212.htm 
http://www3.dataprev.gov.br/sislex/paginas/42/1991/8213.htm 
 24 
which workers who worked for at least 30 years (for men) or 25 years (for women) and 
contributed to Social Security were eligible. The value of this benefit was based on the 
earnings that the worker contributed to the system; however, at least until the end of the 
1990s, most rural workers failed to keep records documenting their previous earnings and 
therefore could mostly apply only for the old-age benefit. According to the Social 
Security Administration, the average rural benefit in 1997 was R$121, while the monthly 
minimum wage was R$120; moreover, less than 0.1% of the rural system pensioners 
were under the length-of-service regime (Ponczek, 2011). Therefore, it is not necessary to 
be concerned with any possible endogeneity caused by different benefit values. 
The increase in the benefit for eligible beneficiaries under the pre-reform rule (the 
old rules) was automatic, i.e., as soon as Congress approved the reform, the value of the 
benefit doubled. Conversely, workers who became eligible after the reform (under the 
new rules) had to go through a registration process that took several months, due to 
administrative red tape. Therefore, the income shock for this group was not automatic. 
For that reason, we use data from 1992, 1993 and 1995 for the post-reform period to 
allow enough time for completion of this registration process. Moreover, as workers must 
apply for the benefit, selectivity bias may emerge; the characteristics that drive a 
worker’s decision to apply might be correlated with the outcome of interest. The 
approach used (which will be described) deals with this concern. 
As the value of income shock differs for workers eligible under the old rules and 
workers eligible under the new rules, we create four different treatment groups. We 
discuss this strategy in detail later. 
The 1991 reform generated an exogenous income shock and represents a good 
opportunity to investigate how income is allocated between household members and how 
such an income shock might affect child labor and educational attainment. 
The number of children in the labor market has decreased in recent years, but it is 
still significantly large. In 1992, 22% of children between 5 and 17 years old were in the 
labor market; in 2008, this number was reduced to 10.2%. In 2008, approximately 51% of 
children in the labor market were working as domestic workers, and approximately 35% 
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worked in rural activities18. In 2009, there were still 4.25 million workers between 5 and 
17 years old.  
There are many empirical studies in the literature that observe the positive impact 
of an increased household income on reducing the incidence of child labor (see Basu and 
Tzannatos (2003) for a survey). Edmonds (2005) studies the impact of the impressive 
economic growth observed in Vietnam between 1993 and 1997 on the reduction in child 
labor and finds that the per-capita-income growth was responsible for reducing child 
labor by nearly 80% among households that experienced per-capita income 
improvements sufficient to move the family out of poverty.  
Duryea and Arend-Kuenning (2003) question the idea that child labor is entirely 
driven by poverty. Their results demonstrate that after controlling for household 
characteristics, employment rates for 14-16-year-old boys and girls in urban Brazil 
increase as labor-market opportunities improve. 
Emerson and Souza (2003) have focused on the dynamics of child labor and 
observe something they call the “child labor trap” – children who work receive less 
human capital and receive less income in the future; therefore, they will be more likely to 
send their own children to the labor market in the future, as well. These researchers 
examine the intergenerational persistence of child labor in Brazil, asking whether the 
child-labor status of parents affects the incidence of child labor among their own 
children. These researchers assess the intergenerational link created by financial need but 
also assess the intergenerational link “over and above that which is transmitted through 
the production of income (perhaps through social norms)”. They find evidence of this 
link even after controlling for income. Another important result shows that children who 
did not work as child laborers earned higher wages in their adult lives, suggesting that the 
gains brought about by human capital and accumulated during childhood surpass the 
gains in experience acquired through apprenticeship. 
A positive exogenous income shock could help to reduce child labor, providing 
the necessary resources for the family to send their children to school and not to the labor 
market. This idea drives conditional-cash transfer programs that reward children who are 
attending school (Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2002)); however, this paper aims to 
                                                 
18 Source: PNAD 2008 and 2009. 
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analyze whether an income shock (which is equivalent to a non-conditional cash transfer) 
would affect education and child labor. 
Carvalho (2000) also investigates the impact of old-age benefits on child labor in 
Brazil and find a reduction in child labor by boys and girls. This paper, however, does not 
focus on the intra-household allocation model. Moreover, the identification strategy 
considers a control group based on the entire population not affected by the reform, and 
this approach could generate inconsistent estimators because of the heterogeneity of the 
treatment and control groups. As will be argued, the identification strategy proposed by 
this research will construct both control and treatment groups that include children living 
with elderly relatives; therefore, no heterogeneity among control and treatment groups 
will jeopardize the estimates. 
The theory that underlies the empirical research in this paper is the classical 
theoretical structure, where we assume child labor occurs only because parents need the 
income to guarantee the children’s survival. Child labor may occur not because of 
parents’ attitudes but because poverty demands child labor for survival. The fact that 
children of the non-poor rarely work, even in very poor countries, supports this idea; 
however, this article does not attempt to deny that there might be other drivers of child 
labor. 
Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to address the impact of old-age 
benefits (income shock targeted to the elderly) on child labor and education in different 
income and socioeconomic quantiles in rural Brazil. Additionally, this work will 
investigate whether the gender of the beneficiary influences the results and whether boys 
and girls are affected differently. The results are especially important for policy-makers; 
if they show that income increases do not reduce child labor, then it may be necessary to 
adopt policies directly targeted to reducing child labor. Moreover, if an income shock to 
the family does not increase education levels, different targeted policies may also be 
preferable. The results would still contribute to knowledge of intra-household allocation 
models, as they would show whether an income shock targeting grandparents is likely to 
affect allocation of resources to children. Furthermore, learning whether old-age benefits 
can reduce the incidence of child labor and increase education would contribute 
considerably to the discussion about allocation of public resources among the elderly, 
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comparing it to how much is allocated directly to children’s education or to other social 
programs. Usually, governments are criticized for designing very expensive social-
security systems. Although that is often the case, knowing whether the system creates 
positive externalities on child development in addition to protecting the elderly helps 
policy-makers to assess this issue. 
 
2.3 Data 
 
The data come from the Brazilian Household Survey PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional 
por Amostras de Domicílios), a sequential cross-section survey conducted on a regular 
basis since 1981 by IBGE (the Brazilian Census Bureau) that contains extensive 
information on the personal and household characteristics of all urban and almost all rural 
areas in Brazil, except the Amazon region. The sample size of PNAD equals 1/500 of the 
Brazilian population. This research uses the 1988, 1889 and 1990 surveys to construct the 
database for the years before the reform that took place in 1991. We use the 1992, 1993 
and 1995 surveys to construct the database for the post-reform years19. 
Unfortunately, these surveys do not provide information about child labor for 
children younger than 10 years or specific information about domestic child labor. 
Therefore, the child labor results are restricted to the impact of income shock on children 
10 years and older. Moreover, the results for girls may be compromised because most 
girls undertake domestic labor. 
Our sample considers children living in rural households composed of a mix of 
adults, children and elderly members who are eligible or almost eligible for social-
security benefits. Table 1 provides summary statistics.  
 
2.4 Identification and Empirical Strategies 
 
The identification strategy must consider that a family’s unobserved 
characteristics might be correlated with family income and with family decisions about 
child labor and education. Therefore, a simple regression of child labor, for example, on 
                                                 
19 In 1994, due to a budgetary crisis, IBGE did not conduct the survey. 
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variation in family income could capture the effect of the parents’ backgrounds and 
intellects, both of which are correlated with income and with the families’ decisions 
about sending their children to the labor market. The Brazilian social security reform 
provides an excellent opportunity to observe an exogenous income shock, which is 
necessary to obtain consistent estimates. This article considers the exogenous income 
shock generated by the reform to measure the significance of an unanticipated increase in 
pension income on child labor and educational attainment and also whether the effects 
depend on the pensioner’s characteristics.  
The empirical strategy considers a difference-in-difference estimator to identify 
the impact of the reform, where children affected by the reform (the treatment group) are 
compared with children not affected by the reform (the control group) before and after 
the reform; however, some problems could arise when constructing the treatment and 
control groups. For example, selectivity bias could arise, as the decision to apply for the 
benefit could be endogenous. Moreover, the benefit depends on past earnings, and the 
income from the benefit could be correlated with unobserved characteristics. To mitigate 
these issues, rather than use the actual treatment group, an intent-to-treat group that 
considers all of the eligible elderly will be created. 
Additionally, families with elderly members may differ from families with no 
elderly members. The presence of an elderly person may be correlated with other 
unobserved variables that may also be correlated with child labor and the children’s 
educational achievements. “Therefore, from one single cross-section, it is impossible to 
disentangle the direct income effect caused by old-age pension from the impacts of living 
with an elderly person. An exogenous reform in social security income variation; 
however, allows separating these effects” (Ponczek, 2011). Consequently, to use 
variation in social-security income among households to analyze the impact of income 
shock on child labor and educational achievements, we need to take these differences into 
account. For that reason, treatment and control groups will be composed of households 
with elderly individuals who are eligible and almost eligible for the program, 
respectively.  
Therefore, the treatment group is composed of members of households with an 
eligible elderly person (under the new and old rules of the system), and the control group 
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is composed of members of households with elderly members who are not old enough to 
be eligible (men between 55 and 60 years and women between 50 and 55 years). We 
believe that this strategy represents an important improvement over Carvalho (2000), as it 
can be used to build similar control and treatment groups, making our findings more 
robust and minimizing the heterogeneity between children living with an elderly family 
member and children with no elderly family member. Heterogeneity between the 
treatment group and a control group could jeopardize the consistency of the estimation if 
it were not properly addressed.  
The impact of the social security reform on family income differs for families 
with a previously eligible member and families with a newly eligible member. The 
impact for those already receiving benefits was felt automatically after July 1991. 
Conversely, the impact for the newly eligible elderly was felt immediately after their 
decision to apply for the benefit. Moreover, for those families that have a newly eligible 
member who now receives the minimum benefit, the amount of the benefit received was 
zero before the reform and one minimum wage afterwards. Alternatively, for those who 
were already beneficiaries, the impact of the reform was half the value of the benefit of 
the newly eligible group; the benefit increased from ½ minimum wage to one minimum 
wage. For that reason, we consider four different treatment groups: two for men and 
women who were eligible under the old rules (minimum ages were 65 years for men and 
60 years for women) and another two treatment groups for men and women who were 
newly eligible under the new rules (a man between 60 and 64 years and a woman 
between 55 and 59 years). 
The difference-in-difference approach requires, for consistent results, that the 
temporal trend in the outcome of interest be the same for both the treatment and the 
control groups, before and after the reform. If the control group has a different temporal 
pattern from the treated group, the difference-in-difference estimator will be biased. The 
use of families with an almost-eligible person (a man between 55 and 60 years and/or a 
woman between 50 and 55 years) as the control group helps to disentangle the true 
treatment effect from the elderly relative effect. We believe that this assumption is 
reasonable. The reduction in the incidence of child labor in Brazil observed over time, as 
well as the improvements in education achievements, reinforce the importance of having 
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a control group that is truly comparable to the treatment group for consistent estimates of 
the impact of the reform. 
Moreover, we decided to construct the pre- and post-reform periods using three 
years of data for each period, as for those who became eligible after the reform or 
decided to apply after the change in rules, the entire registration process took several 
months, due to administrative delays. It is possible that newly eligible workers ignored 
the new rules of the system for a length of time, thereby affecting the proportion of new 
members who entered the system just after 1991. Therefore, we use datasets from 1992 to 
1995 (the post-reform year range) to allow the inclusion process for the newly eligible to 
run its course. 
Anticipation of benefits might interfere with our results. We could observe 
changes in the behavior of our control group if members anticipated that they would 
become eligible soon, but there was a severe credit constraint in the Brazilian economy 
during the 1980s and early 1990s—even more so among rural families; therefore, 
families would not anticipate benefit guarantees. Moreover, as observed by Ponczek 
(2011), “ignorance of pension benefits is another probable reason why those families do 
not bring this future income to the present”. Edmonds (2006)20 reaches a similar 
conclusion for South Africa, i.e., families that become eligible do not anticipate the future 
income and therefore do not experience changes in schooling before the income pension 
is available. He also argues that liquidity constraint is the most consistent explanation for 
his findings. 
 
The model to be estimated is the following: 
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20 E. V. Edmonds. Child labor and schooling responses to anticipated income in South Africa. Journal of 
Development Economics, 81(2):386{414, December 2006. URL 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/deveco/v81y2006i2p386-414.html. 
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where Y is one of the outcomes of interest (child labor, literacy, school 
attendance); jkT s are binary variables for the four different treatment groups with j = 
male, female and k = old rule, new rule – (1) children living with females eligible under 
the old rules, (2) children living with males eligible under the old rules, (3) children 
living with females eligible under the new rules, (4) children living with males eligible 
under the new rules; Post is a binary variable that represents the post-reform years; W is a 
vector of household and personal characteristics, such as age, age squared, gender, race, 
family size, number of children in the family; age, gender, race and education of the head 
and the oldest member of the family. 
Considering this specification, the parameter of interest ( j k,3β ) is our difference-
in-difference estimator. After estimating the old-age reform impact for families of all 
income levels, we separately estimate the same impact for families with different 
socioeconomic levels. For each socioeconomic level q (q = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), we estimate 
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where we are interested in jqk
,
,3β for the different qs. 
We create a socioeconomic index level using principal-component factor analysis, 
based on the head of household’s education, occupation, sector of activity, family size, 
durable goods possession and family house’s characteristics, such as presence of sewage 
system and brick walls. 
To determine the consistency of our estimates, we consider Two-Stage Least 
Square models, where we use the reform dummies as instruments for family income. The 
results from the first stage use the reform to predict family income, and the second stage 
estimates the effect of family income (instrumented) on child outcomes; however, this 
approach does not allow verification of whether the impacts depend on the pensioner’s 
characteristics (male or female, eligible under old or new rules of the system).  
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2.5 Results 
 
Table 2 shows that the reform did  have an important impact on family income. It 
presents the regression using the difference-in-difference strategy just described where 
the dependent variable is the log per-capita family income. We can observe that ex-ante, 
children living with eligible members belonged to families with smaller per capita 
income. The coefficients from the first column reveal that our identification strategy 
captures the income shock suffered by the families with eligible members, due to the 
social security reform. Treated families experienced significant income growth compared 
to their counterparts in the control group. The parameters ( j k,3β ) are all significantly 
different from zero. In addition, the impact of living with an eligible man ( malenew,3β ) and 
( maleold,3β ) is not significantly different from the impact of living with an eligible woman 
( femalenew,3β ) and (
female
old,3β ), respectively. Additionally, even though we expected the 
magnitude of the income shock to be higher among new eligible members than among 
old eligible members, the coefficients of old eligible members (men and women) are 
significantly higher than the coefficients of new eligible members, which may be 
reflecting delays in new registrations to the system. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows 
how average family income behaved in the treatment and control groups before and after 
the reform. 
Examining each income quantile, we did not always find that the reform caused 
significant income growth among treated families. One possible explanation is the 
disincentive that people from higher income groups have to apply for this kind of benefit, 
due to its relatively low value; however, an analysis of the impact of an income shock in 
different income quantiles might be problematic, as the shock might change families’ 
positions in the distribution, jeopardizing the before-and-after comparison. For that 
reason, we prefer to analyze the effects on families from different socioeconomic 
positions. Treated families from all socioeconomic levels experienced significant income 
growth compared with their counterparts in the control group (Table 2). 
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Ponzeck (2011) also observes that the reform had no significant impact on adults’ 
labor market outcome (e.g., employment and job search); “therefore, there is no evidence 
that extra income caused any reduction on the labor supply of those adults directly 
affected by the social security reform”. 
Table 3 contains the results of the difference-in-difference specification for child-
labor outcomes21. The first column provides the results for the entire sample, and the next 
columns present the results for the different socioeconomic quintiles. Ex-ante, children 
living with newly eligible females are more likely to work than children living with 
elderly members of the control groups; however, after the reform, children living with the 
same newly eligible females are less likely to be working. To illustrate this point, we can 
see that children with a female from the new treatment group, femalenew,3β , are 4.8 percentage 
points less likely to work. As expected, children living within families with an educated 
male head of household are less likely to be working. Moreover, families with more 
children have a higher probability of sending their children to the labor market. 
Tables 3a and 3b separate the results for girls and boys, revealing significant 
differences. Before the reform, girls living with already eligible males were less likely to 
be working. As we can observe, the income shock due to the social security reform seems 
to have had no impact in the occurrence of child labor among girls (Table 3a). Elderly 
females who are newly eligible for Social Security seem to use the new income for the 
benefit of their granddaughters, taking them out of the labor market, but this result is only 
slightly significant (10%). We believe that the reason for this mild impact on girls’ child 
labor is the fact that our dependent variable “child labor” does not specifically consider 
domestic child labor, which is the activity performed by most of girls in the labor market. 
In addition, Table 3b reveals that social security reform seems to have had no impact in 
the occurrence of child labor among boys. Boys living with elderly females newly 
eligible for Social Security seem to be less likely to be working, but this result is 
significant only at 10%. For instance, the presence of a newly eligible female member 
                                                 
21 In our sample of children between 10 and 14 years old, we have 2177 children in the treatment group (1) 
- children living with females eligible under the old rules, 2801 children in the treatment group (2) - 
children living with males eligible under the old rules, 2742 children in the treatment group (3) - children 
living with females eligible under the new rules, and 2026 children in the treatment group (4) - children 
living with males eligible under the new rules. 
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(Female Treatmentnew x Post) reduces by 4.3 and 5.6 percentage points the likelihood of 
having a girl and a boy working in the family, respectively.   
Tables 4 and 5 analyze the difference-in-difference impacts on the education 
variables for children between the ages of 6 and 14 years in the rural area22. We focus on 
children in that age range because from 6 to 14 years, any child can complete the 
mandatory primary and secondary levels. The Brazilian constitution requires that 
municipalities provide primary education (up to 8 years of schooling), and states must 
provide secondary education (3 years of schooling); however, there are many costs—for 
transportation and school supplies, for example—other than tuition that might prevent 
children from going to school. Child labor is relatively common in rural areas; therefore, 
an income shock may have a positive effect on educational attainment variables. Table 4 
shows the difference-in-difference estimates when literacy is the dependent variable. We 
observe that in general, ex-ante, children living with elderly members from treatment 
groups seem to be less literate than children living with elderly members from the control 
group, except for children living with females already eligible for Social Security. The 
“post” variable shows the positive trend in education attainments observed in Brazil 
during these years. The coefficients of the control variables are all significant and have 
the expected signs. Children living with families with a white, educated male head of 
household have higher literacy. 
The difference-in-difference estimates reveal that living with an eligible male has 
a positive and significant impact on a child’s literacy. For instance, the presence of a 
newly eligible male member (Male Treatmentnew x Post) increases by 5.0 percentage 
points the likelihood of literacy (Table 4). Children living with an already eligible male 
are 2.6 percentage points more likely to be literate but only at 10%. Curiously, the 
presence of any eligible female members does not seem to have any impact on the 
literacy level of children, in contrast to the usual findings in literature regarding this 
topic.  
                                                 
22 Considering our sample of children between 6 and 14 years old, we have 3611 children in the treatment 
group (1) - children living with females eligible under the old rules, 4425 children in the treatment group 
(2) - children living with males eligible under the old rules, 4079 children in the treatment group (3) - 
children living with females eligible under the new rules, and 3097 children in the treatment group (4) - 
children living with males eligible under the new rules. 
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Dividing the sample into boys and girls (Table 4a and 4b), we find that only the 
literacy levels of girls living with eligible males is positively correlated with the income 
shock. Boys are barely benefited, as the impacts are positive but significant at only 10%.  
 Table 5 shows the difference-in-difference estimates when school attendance is 
the dependent variable. For the entire sample, we observe that ex-ante, children living 
with eligible members females are as likely to attend school as children living with 
members from the control group. The difference-in-difference estimates reveal that after 
the reform, living with an eligible male increased children’s attendance. The presence of 
an eligible male under the new rule increases by 4.8 percentage points the likelihood of a 
child attending school after the reform. Eligible males under the old system’s rule help to 
increase the attendance of grandchildren by 3.8 percentage points. 
Tables 5a and 5b separate the results for girls and boys. The difference-in-
difference estimates reveal that after the reform, living with a newly eligible male 
increases boys’ and girls’23 attendance; however, already-eligible females seem to benefit 
their granddaughters, increasing their school attendance by 6.5 percentage points (Table 
5a). 
In summary, we do not always find the same impacts of old-age benefits and 
income shock that are found in the literature. The studies devoted to such questions 
usually reveal that women have a preference for girls in the family, while men, when they 
exert some control over the children’ education, tend to prefer boys; however, our 
estimates suggest that men also dedicate their additional income to the education of their 
granddaughters. One possible explanation is that men and women have different 
bargaining powers inside the family.  
One question raised by such results is whether the impact of the income shock on 
children we find on average would be found if we focused on families with different 
income and socioeconomic levels. Would we confirm these results looking at families 
from the lowest income and socioeconomic levels or would we find something more 
similar to what is found in the literature about the subject? Therefore, aside from looking 
at the impact of the income shock on child labor, literacy and school attendance, this 
study raises the question of whether children living in families with different income 
                                                 
23 The impact on girls in significant only at 10%. 
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levels would experience the same effects. The income shock might move families among 
the income quantiles, complicating analyses of the before and after shock impacts in 
different income groups. Therefore, the next step is to develop a socioeconomic index 
based on variables, such as education, occupation and durable goods possession, to 
separate families by their “wealth” and not by their income level. 
 A socioeconomic index (SES) was developed using principal-component factor 
analysis, considering variables like (i) possession of durable goods (TV, refrigerator, 
stove and water filter); (ii) type of house construction (which material was used on the 
walls); (iii) sewage system; (iv) education of head of household; and (v) labor-market 
characteristics—such as occupation and sector of activity—of head of household. We 
also developed a second SES that considered only the first four items of the previous 
SES. 
The analysis of the first socioeconomic index24 shows that the impacts are 
concentrated at the lowest SES quintile. Moreover, the results suggest again that a man 
might have more bargaining power inside the family, which would explain some of the 
differences in the results found in the literature. When looking at all children together, we 
generally confirm that the old-age benefits paid to a man help to increase child literacy 
and attendance, and we find that such impact is concentrated in the lowest socioeconomic 
quintile. A female’s impact on child labor is also concentrated in the first socioeconomic 
index quintile.  
If we consider girls separately, again we observe that the female’s impacts on 
child labor and attendance are concentrated in the first socioeconomic index quintile. 
Additionally, elderly men who benefited under the new rules and old rules of the system 
exert a positive impact on the literacy and attendance of their granddaughters in the 
lowest quintile.  
Considering the impact on boys, although we do not find on average that elderly 
men’s benefits are partially allocated to improve boys’ education, we observe that this 
outcome is not what is observed among families from the lowest socioeconomic quintile. 
Elderly men from the lowest quintile exert a positive impact on attendance of their 
                                                 
24 A different definition of socioeconomic index produces similar results. 
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grandsons. The only result that puzzles us is the positive and significant impact of female 
elders on boys’ child labor in the top socioeconomic quintile.  
Table A1 in the Appendix shows Two-Stage Least Square estimates, where we 
use the social security reform dummies as instruments for family income; however, as 
this approach does not allow us to verify whether the impacts depend on the pensioner’s 
characteristics (male or female, eligible under old or new rules of the system), we not 
always find the same results as those observed above. The income shock seems to have a 
positive impact only on girls’ school attendance. The previous approach revealed that 
girls’ attendance increased for girls living with both eligible males and females; 
therefore, the two-stage least-square approach captures all of these impacts. 
Some may question the adopted strategy, arguing that we could observe changes 
in the behavior of our control group because they would anticipate that they would 
become eligible soon. As mentioned, the main reason that we are comfortable saying that 
this would not be a problem is because there was severe credit constraint in the Brazilian 
economy during the 1980s and early 1990s. This constraint would be even more severe 
among rural families. Moreover, ignorance of pension benefits is another probable reason 
why those families do not bring this future income to the present.  
To investigate the adequacy of our identification strategy and our control group, 
we construct a false treatment group composed of previous control groups (women aged 
between 45 and 50 years and men aged between 55 and 60 years) and compare them with 
a new younger control group (women aged between 40 and 45 years and men aged 
between 50 and 55 years). If the original control group would anticipate their entrance 
into the system and change their behavior, we would observe, in the regression just 
described, a different impact for children living with the new (false) treatment group 
compared with the new (younger) control group; however, Table A2 in the Appendix 
does not show such a difference. 
Finally, we further examine if our results favoring those children living with 
eligible males are motivated by differences in the bargaining power of men and women 
within Brazilian families, as was formerly observed. To investigate that problem, we 
perform two separate regressions, with one considering children living within families 
with male heads of household and the other considering only children living with female 
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heads of household. When observing children living with male head of households, 
eligible males exert the same positive impact on literacy and attendance as described 
above; however, the same is not true when we look at children living with female heads 
of household. On the other hand, we observe that the presence of an eligible female head 
explain the positive impact on boys’ child labor and girls’ attendance, as shown in Table 
A3 in the Appendix.  
Therefore, such results support the idea that bargaining power differences 
between men and women within households explain the uneven effects for children living 
with eligible males and eligible females. 
 
2.6 Final Remarks 
 
The income shock experienced by rural Brazilian families after the 1991 reform 
resulted in an improvement in the educational attainments of children living with eligible 
males. Moreover, eligible females helped their grandsons to leave the labor market in 
cases of child labor. The analysis of the socioeconomic index shows that the impacts are 
concentrated in the lowest SES quintile. 
 We do not always find the same impacts of old-age benefits and income shocks 
that are found in the literature. The studies devoted to such questions usually reveal that 
women have a preference for girls in the family, while men, when they exert some 
control over their children’s education, tend to prefer boys; however, our estimates 
suggest that men also dedicate their additional income to the education of their 
granddaughters. The analysis of the impacts on different socioeconomic levels confirms 
these results. One possible explanation is that men and women have different degrees of 
bargaining power inside the family. On the other hand, female heads of household seem 
to favor their grandsons in cases of child labor and to invest in their granddaughters’ 
education, as well. 
Such results suggest the idea that bargaining power differences between men and 
women within the household explain the uneven effects for children living with eligible 
males and eligible females. 
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Chapter 3 
Student Proficiency and Teacher Effect: Impact on Students with Different Levels of 
Achievement 
 
Priscila Pereira Deliberalli 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The literature on the economics of education has shown that family background is 
decisive in determining children’s educational attainment. Nevertheless, such findings 
should not be interpreted to mean that schools and teachers play only a minor role in 
children’s school performance. The recent literature has shown that schools and teacher 
quality explain an important part of children’s educational development as well; however, 
these findings usually do not test whether teacher contribution is the same for students 
with lower initial test scores and those with higher initial test scores. Therefore, this study 
will test whether teachers are more or less important in helping student test scores to 
improve when students have poor test scores initially. 
The reform of the public education system has played a major role in policy 
debates in Brazil over the last several years, especially after the universalization of 
standardized student-achievement evaluations. The disappointing performance of 
students on language and mathematics tests and the gap between students from public 
and private schools on most measures of academic achievement have worried parents and 
policymakers, increasing the pressure to restructure the entire system. Nearly everyone 
involved in the education process recognizes the importance of teacher quality to student 
achievement. School administrators and policymakers, aware of such connections, have 
established some criteria for hiring high-quality teachers, aiming to improve student 
proficiency progress. Therefore, it is crucial to have adequate measures of teacher 
quality; however, little is known about how teachers affect different kinds of students, 
and this lack of knowledge is especially worrying when the public school system decides 
to implement accountability programs using student achievement in teacher assessment 
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and placing achievement-related accountability pressure on individual teachers and 
schools.   
The measure of the impact of teacher quality on students is not straightforward, as 
we cannot simply compare groups of students from different teachers. The school 
performance of a group of students would depend, besides the quality of its teacher, on (i) 
the starting knowledge levels of students, (ii) their endowments (abilities and family 
backgrounds), and (iii) the teacher’s working condition, for example, the school’s 
infrastructure. Therefore, any theoretical model and empirical strategy need to account 
for these problems when attempting to measure the effect of teacher quality on student 
school performance. Part of this heterogeneity in student and teacher working conditions 
can be controlled by including observed characteristics of the students, families, and 
schools, but most studies include fixed effects to control for at least the time-invariant 
heterogeneity. Therefore, the objective of empirical analysis is to obtain estimates of 
differences in teacher contributions to student-learning progress that eliminates the major 
sources of possible confounding from student heterogeneity or teacher-assignment 
practices. 
To evaluate teacher contributions to student achievement, value-added models 
have been used to isolate teacher contributions to student performance based on previous 
student proficiency levels and individual background. If a theoretical model does not 
control for the history of past inputs and individual endowment (student achievement as a 
function of contemporaneous factors only), it poses serious omitted variable problems. 
Conversely, value-added models are susceptible to endogeneity bias when certain 
important inputs are missing, as they include lagged achievement measures. Although 
analysis using value-added models evaluates whether a teacher does a better job than the 
others of improving student test scores than do other teachers, these analyses usually do 
not signal if teacher’s contribution is the same for students with lower and higher starting 
test scores Therefore, this study will analyze whether teachers are more or less important 
in helping students to improve test scores when students have poor past test 
performances. The analysis will be based on value-added measures of student 
achievement in the São Paulo school district, which is the largest school district in Brazil. 
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 The results reveal that low-achieving students exposed to better-quality teachers25 
would expect to achieve 0.61 and 0.6026 standard deviations higher in Portuguese and 
mathematics test-score performances. At the same time, high achieving students have 
Portuguese and mathematics scores increased by 0.57 and 0.73 standard deviations when 
exposed to better quality teachers; however, such impact represents a larger proportion of 
the average test score gains for high-achieving students. Moreover, if we analyze the 
impact of teachers on different students inside the same classroom, we also observe that 
students in the top of the test score distribution benefit more from better quality teachers. 
 
3.2 Literature 
 
Several studies have attempted to identify teacher effects on student achievement. 
Most of these studies have attempted to investigate the relationship between teacher 
credentials, teacher quality, and student achievement to provide information to 
policymakers about criteria for hiring and policies to raise the quality of teachers. These 
studies usually reveal that most observable teacher characteristics – such as schooling and 
experience – have a weak relationship with student performance. Such analyses 
demystify some beliefs showing, for example, that teacher experience helps to improve 
student proficiency only up to a certain point and that higher educational degrees, such as 
Master’s degrees and PhDs, do not necessarily contribute to student advancement; 
however, these findings cannot be interpreted to mean that teacher quality does not 
influences student achievement. Instead, this finding means that other unobservable 
teacher characteristics may explain most of teacher heterogeneity. As teacher quality is 
driven by characteristics that are difficult to measure, teacher quality measures have to be 
based directly on student performance.  
Rockoff (2004) includes student fixed effect to control for previous student 
knowledge and also to control for differences in the potential learning capacity of each 
student. This study compares teachers in the same school to control for working 
conditions and school characteristics impact. The author argues that “observing the same 
                                                 
25 One standard deviation increase in teacher quality. 
26 Grades are normalized by year and grade. 
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teacher with multiple classrooms allows me to differentiate teacher quality from factors 
like class size. In addition, by focusing on variation in student achievement within 
particular schools and years, I separate variation in teacher quality from variation in 
school-level education inputs and time-varying factors that affect test performance at the 
school level”. The results reveal that a one-standard-deviation increase in teacher quality 
increases student test scores by approximately 0.1 standard deviations in reading and 
mathematics. 
Clotfelter et al. (2007) use end-of-course test scores in multiple subjects to 
analyze the relationship between teacher credentials and student achievement in high 
school, estimating student fixed-effect models in the context of a model estimated across 
subject, rather than fixed effect in a model estimated over time. Student fixed effect helps 
to mitigate the nonrandom distribution of students among classrooms and teachers. These 
researchers’ results reveal that teacher credentials affect student achievement 
systematically at the high school level, as on average, students exposed to teachers with 
weak sets of credentials would expect to achieve 0.3 standard deviations lower than 
students exposed to teachers with strong sets of credentials. Moreover, having a teacher 
with strong credentials could on average even offset adverse effects of racial and 
socioeconomic differences among students. 
 While several studies try to estimate the relationship between teacher 
characteristics and attributes and their impact on student achievement, Grossman et al. 
(2010) try to observe what instructional practices differentiate teachers with high value 
added from teachers with low value added to students. The authors believe that “teachers’ 
classroom practices are likely to be the mechanism by which teachers affect students” 
and the knowledge of the “classroom practices that are more characteristic of more 
effective teachers” provides policymakers tools for improving the quality of education for 
all students. , These authors’ results reveal that teachers at the top of the value-added 
distribution score higher in all elements of instruction practices observed and that these 
differences are statistically significant for an important subset of practices. 
Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007) use quasi-value-added models (controlling 
for student performance in t – 1) to control for previous student knowledge. Moreover, 
these researchers control for other student and family characteristics to capture 
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differences in the potential learning capacity of each student. These authors compare 
teachers in the same school when those schools have identical observable characteristics. 
The analyses find that studying with a teacher two standard deviations higher in quality 
could add 25% to 45% of an average school year to student mathematics performance. 
Moreover, the authors stratify the students into ability groups and find that “a two 
standard deviation improvement in teacher quality is still worth a sizable gain in average 
test score growth, particularly among the middle and low achieving population”. 
Buddin (2010) observes that “teacher experience and educational background 
have weak effects on teacher effectiveness. Teacher experience has little effect on (…) 
scores beyond the first couple of years of teaching (…) and teacher education beyond a 
bachelor’s degree has no statistically significant effect”. Moreover, the authors suggest 
that “teachers with better prepared students have some small advantage in measured 
effectiveness. A one standard deviation in the mean ELA (English Language Arts) and 
mathematics scores of teacher’s new students is associated with about a 0.03-point 
increase in the teacher’s value added”. The objective of this study is to analyze this 
subject further.  
 
3.3 Empirical Strategy 
 
To measure the impact of teacher quality on student school performance, we have 
to manage certain methodological obstacles and data limitations. As Todd and Wolpin 
(2003) note, “ideally, model estimation requires a comprehensive history of all past and 
present family and school/teacher inputs as well as information about each student’s 
endowed ability. This complete information is not available; however, leading to 
potential biases due to student unobserved heterogeneity, teacher unobserved 
heterogeneity and nonrandom assignment of students to particular teachers”. Therefore, 
we cannot simply compare groups of students from different teachers and explain such 
differences based on their teacher performances. The educational achievements of 
students would depend on other factors besides the quality of their teacher. First, teachers 
have students with different starting knowledge levels, and therefore the comparison of 
those students’ final levels of proficiency will be compromised. If students with higher 
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starting knowledge levels are allocated to better teachers, then we will overestimate the 
effects of teacher quality when comparing these students with students from lower quality 
teachers. To manage this problem, the models estimated must account for the initial 
heterogeneity in student proficiency , which can be accomplished by estimating the 
impact of teachers on the proficiency acquired while studying with that teacher (value-
added models) or by specifically controlling for the initial proficiency level (quasi-value-
added models). 
Second, students may have different learning capacities and endowments (abilities 
and family backgrounds). Ideally, students should be randomly allocated to teachers such 
that teachers have students with the same capacities and endowments. Nevertheless, that 
allocation is not usually the case. We can only partially account for these differences 
when controlling for the initial proficiency levels, as two students with the same initial 
knowledge may end up with different proficiency levels at the end of one year in the 
same class with the same teacher; however, certain student and family characteristics 
may predict such learning capacity differences. Therefore, the model estimated should 
also include student and family characteristics. 
Third, to access the impact of teachers on student performance, ideally we have to 
compare teachers with the same working conditions, such as school infrastructure. The 
literature about empirical education production function and teacher quality always 
emphasizes the importance of school-level factors, such as school size and composition, 
principal characteristics, and curriculum. If better-quality teachers work in schools with 
characteristics that may positively influence student performance, then we would 
overestimate the effect of teachers; however, as our estimates are based on achievement 
gains, we would only be concerned if there were changes in such school factors during 
the three-year period analyzed.27  
Our concern in estimating teacher quality is whether there is nonrandom sorting 
when placing students with certain teachers. However, informal discussions with São 
Paulo school district representatives suggest that the process is not based on student 
characteristics, and there is no parental influence on teacher selection. 
                                                 
27 Some researchers use school fixed effects to control for time invariant school differences and, as a result, 
they compare teachers in the same school; however, we tried to run a school fixed-effect model, but as 
many teachers work in only one school, several teacher dummies were excluded from such regression. 
 45 
The main purpose of this research is to analyze if the teacher effect may change 
with different student populations (based on their students’ initial knowledge), i.e., the 
teacher effect may be different for a student who is still in the bottom of the test score 
distribution than for a student who is already in the top of the distribution. Therefore, we 
stratify the sample into ability groups based on the previous year’s test score 
performances and estimate the teacher effect within ability group. The quasi-value-added 
model estimates, where the impact of lagged schooling, family background, and other 
characteristics are captured in the lagged test score measure, is as follows: 
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where 
Xit would include such variables as classroom characteristics (class size, peer 
composition – proportion of female and white students) 
ui would include such variables as student’s gender, race, and parents’ education 
pj are dummies for teachers 
ηit contains time variant student and teacher unobserved characteristics 
l represents the different ability groups. 
 
We run regressions separately for the different l proficiency level or ability 
groups. The l ability groups are stratified in two different ways. First, we consider the 
whole distribution of students and separate them into low-, medium-, and high-
achievement student groups. Students in the bottom 25% of the previous year’s test score 
distribution are considered low-achieving students; students in the top 25% of the same 
distribution are considered high-achieving students; the remainders are considered 
medium-achievement. Therefore, students in the bottom (top) of the distribution will be 
students with low (high) nominal values of proficiency level; however, when comparing 
teacher effect on these different groups, we would not be comparing the same teachers 
necessarily. As Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007) observe, “looking at subgroups of 
students with more similar initial test scores should help reduce the possibility that 
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teacher effect estimates are simply measuring test score growth related to normalization 
issues”. 
Second, we stratify the sample into l ability groups inside each classroom into 
four groups. The idea is to analyze if the “same” teacher may have a different impact on 
different students inside the classroom, i.e., whether students that are in a relatively lower 
branch of the distribution are benefited equally by a better teacher. Consequently, 
students in the lower (top) group will not necessarily have low (high) proficiency levels, 
but they are the worst (best) students of each teacher. This procedure guarantees that we 
will be comparing the same teachers across the different groups. 
Parental characteristics influence neighborhood and school choices, which could 
cause some potential bias. Nevertheless, Brazilian families’ decisions about where to live 
are normally based primarily on income level; families do not decide where to live based 
on the quality of the public-school system. In general, low-income students attend public 
schools near their homes, and their families’ decisions about where to live do not 
consider school quality, only the ability to afford to live in the neighborhood. The 
covariate “father’s education” partially controls for family income and therefore for the 
choice of neighborhood.  
 Kaine and Staiger (2002) note that the variance in the estimate of teacher effect 
may be inflated by sampling variability. To attenuate this problem partially, we restrict 
our sample to students with teachers who had at least 10 students per year. The final 
regressions include year dummy variables, as well. 
 
3.4 Data 
 
The pressure to improve the quality of public education has led certain Brazilian 
states and cities to apply their own standardized achievement tests to measure the 
performance of their schools. Such tests have enabled the creation of a database with 
individual student identifiers, linking students with teachers and schools and allowing us 
to track student progress over time. The current study will be based on São Paulo’s public 
school students, who were followed for three years from 2007 to 2009. The sample will 
follow only students from the second through the fourth grade, as students in higher 
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grades have more than one teacher, which would make it more difficult to isolate the 
teacher effect. 
Table 1 contains summary statistics. We have information for approximately 
11,000 students in 2008 and 2009. When in the third grade (2008), the students are, on 
average, 9.6 years old, and in the fourth grade (2009), they are 10.6 years old; 46% of 
them are female, and 40% are white. Their fathers have, on average, little more than four 
years of education. 
Teachers may enter and exit the data set, but teacher effects are only identified by 
students who change teachers (from year to year). The sample has students for whom we 
have grade information for at least two years. 
 
3.5 Results 
 
Student test scores in Portuguese and mathematics are standardized by grade and 
year. We consider only students in the third and fourth grades, as after the fourth grade, 
students have more than one teacher per year. The impact of student X’s covariates is 
based on the variation in X across students for each specific teacher. Certain student 
characteristics have a significant effect on achievement level, even after controlling for 
student test scores in the previous year. Therefore, learning progress seems to be 
influenced by some student characteristics aside from the teacher quality. Table 3 reveals 
that female and white students have advantages over the other students. The father’s 
education level also helps yield higher student proficiency. Class size does not seem to 
have any impact on growth in student proficiency; however, if we do not restrict our 
sample to classrooms with at least 10 students, class size seems to matter for teaching 
mathematics.28 Peer gender does not help to explain grade evolution, but peer race seems 
to matter to progress in language proficiency.  
The dispersions in teacher quality are similar if we include peer characteristics; 
therefore, we decide to consider specifications (II) for language and (IV) for mathematics 
in Table 3. The results imply that a one-standard-deviation improvement in teacher 
                                                 
28 See Appendix for results. 
 48 
quality produces on average a 0.38 standard deviation gain in language test scores and 
0.42 gain in mathematics test scores. Remember that the test scores are standardized. 
We are particularly interested in analyzing the teacher effect on different student 
populations, especially on those achieving at the lowest and highest levels. We stratify 
the sample into ability groups based on Portuguese and mathematics test scores from the 
previous year and subsequently estimate the teacher effect within low and high ability 
groups. Low-ability students are those who had scores in the bottom 25% of the grade 
distribution, and high-ability students are those who had scores in the top 25% of the 
same distribution. The low-ability students have mean Portuguese and mathematics 
scores of 113.1 and 122.9, respectively, in the third grade and means of 126.1 and 139.1 
in the fourth grade. Considering high ability students, mean Portuguese and mathematics 
scores are 185.9 and 198.9, respectively, in the third grade and 216.4 and 223.6 in the 
fourth grade. The results in Table 4 show that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
teacher quality raises Portuguese score performances by 0.61, 0.48, and 0.57 for low, 
medium, and high achievement students; however, such impact represents a bigger 
proportion of the average test score increase for high achievement students than for low 
achievement students. The same results are observed for mathematics scores where a 
one-standard-deviation increase in teacher quality raises mathematics score performances 
by 0.60, 0.51, and 0.73 for low, medium, and high achievement students, which also 
represents a larger proportion of the average test score growth for high achievement 
students. 
The above mentioned results show that the teacher may have a stronger impact on 
high-achieving students; however, we would like to analyze whether the same teacher 
also has a different impact on students in the bottom of the classroom distribution 
compared to those students in the top of the proficiency distribution in the same 
classroom. This stratification permits us to compare the same teachers, as all of them will 
have students in the bottom and the top of the classroom distribution. Table 5 shows that 
students in the top of the classroom distribution would benefit more from a better quality 
teacher. Having a one-standard-deviation increase in teacher quality raises Portuguese 
score performances by 0.51 and 0.66 standard deviations for students in the bottom and 
the top of the distribution, respectively. However, again, as students in the top of the 
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distribution have a smaller average test score increment, the teacher’s impact represents a 
higher proportion of achievement progress. Considering the impact of teachers on 
mathematics performance, a one-standard-deviation increase in teacher quality raises 
student test scores by 0.54 and 0.78 standard deviations for students in the bottom and the 
top of the distribution, respectively. In this study, the impact of a better quality teacher is 
significantly higher for those students in the top of the classroom distribution. 
Table 5 also shows a Chow’s Test in which we analyze whether the explanatory 
variables have different impacts on different subgroups of the sample. The results reveal 
that the subgroups of students in the bottom and the top of the distribution are differently 
affected by the independent variable, including the teacher dummies, compared to the rest 
of their classmates.  
  
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Reforming the public education system has played a major role in policy debates 
over the last several years, especially after the universalization of standardized student-
achievement evaluations, which revealed the disappointing performance of students on 
language and mathematics tests and the gap between students from public and private 
schools on most measures of academic achievement. School administrators and 
policymakers, aware of such findings, have established new criteria for hiring high-
quality teachers, aiming to improve student progress. Therefore, it is crucial to have 
adequate measures of teacher quality. This lack of knowledge is principally worrisome 
when the public school system implements accountability programs using student 
achievement in teacher assessments and placing achievement-related accountability 
pressure on individual teachers and schools.   
These results bring two important pieces of information to policymakers and 
school administrators. First, high-achieving students benefit more easily from high-
quality teachers than do low-achieving students. Therefore, policymakers and school 
principals should act even more strongly concerning better training for or general 
improvement of teachers who teach low-achieving students.  
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Second, teacher-reward policies based on student performance evaluations must 
account for these different impacts on students. As many observable characteristics are 
not related to teacher quality, reward policies must be based on the relationship between 
teacher and student performance. 
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TABLES AND CHARTS 
Chapter 1 Tables and Charts 
Table 1.1 – Summary Statistics 
All Sample (%) Formal (%) Informal (%)
Age (years) 36.97 36.30 37.68
Female 41.89 38.95 45.03
Male 58.11 61.05 54.97
Married 63.63 64.68 62.51
White 51.51 58.21 44.40
Education
less than 1 year 6.53 3.50 9.75
between 1 and 4 years 22.05 16.37 28.09
between 5 and 8 years 29.35 26.33 32.56
between 9 and 14 years 34.09 41.93 25.77
15 years or more 7.98 11.87 3.84
Region
North 10.47 7.67 13.45
Northeast 26.35 20.80 32.23
Southeast 34.37 39.27 29.16
South 17.91 21.82 13.74
Middle-west 10.91 10.43 11.41
Metropolitan area 44.82 48.57 40.85
Ocupation
Managers 6.51 9.06 3.80
Scientists and artists 5.74 7.31 4.08
Technicians 7.39 9.17 5.50
Services 25.67 22.61 28.92
Salesman 14.11 9.71 18.79
Industry employees 32.07 28.76 35.58
Administrative services 8.40 13.26 3.24
Other ocupations 0.07 0.09 0.04
Sector
Industry 18.69 22.70 14.44
Construction 9.60 5.30 14.16
Retail 24.73 22.73 26.84
Food and Lodging 5.22 4.07 6.44
Transport and Communication 6.73 7.56 5.85
Public Administration 2.45 3.87 0.95
Health and Education 7.35 10.95 3.52
Housekeeping 10.66 6.31 15.28
Other sectors 14.57 16.51 12.51
On leave 1.76 2.51 0.97
No activity for health reasons 5.87 5.14 6.65
Health condition
Excellent 22.40 25.87 18.71
Good 56.27 57.38 55.09
Regular 18.97 15.26 22.91
Poor 1.99 1.24 2.78
Very poor 0.36 0.24 0.50
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Table 1.2 – Probability to receive treatment (formal worker) 
All Sample Female Male
age 0.060 0.062 0.057
(30.79)*** (19.30)*** (22.65)***
age_sq -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-32.97)*** (-20.54)*** (-24.86)***
white 0.048 0.067 0.041
(5.24)*** (4.67)*** (3.42)***
female -0.361                
(-36.14)***                
education 0.061 0.052 0.066
(47.65)*** (24.94)*** (40.10)***
married 0.0549 -0.124 0.215
(5.94)*** (-9.26)*** (16.27)***
North -0.32 -0.414 -0.273
(-17.87)*** (-14.34)*** (-11.89)***
Northeast -0.247 -0.314 -0.209
(-16.57)*** (-13.32)*** (-10.79)***
Southeast 0.183 0.118 0.229
(12.76)*** (5.23)*** (12.23)***
South 0.267 0.238 0.292
(16.46)*** (9.42)*** (13.70)***
metropolitan area 0.136 0.157 0.117
(15.94)*** (11.89)*** (10.36)***
managers -0.420 -0.300 -0.416
(-17.66)*** (-8.20)*** (-12.63)***
scientists and artists -0.869 -0.751 -0.883
(-35.35)*** (-22.38)*** (-24.03)***
techinicias -0.735 -0.556 -0.766
(-33.00)*** (-16.70)*** (-24.24)***
services employees -0.435 -0.548 -0.258
(-21.75)*** (-19.50)*** (-8.78)***
salesman -0.994 -1.12 -0.877
(-47.12)*** (-36.84)*** (-28.28)***
industry employees -0.836 -0.871 -0.705
(-41.72)*** (-24.42)*** (-25.21)***
other ocupations -1.28 -1.215
(-8.20)*** (-7.56)***
civil construction sector -0.846 -0.003 -1.015
(-49.44)*** (-0.03) (-53.71)***
retail sector -0.359 0.023 -0.552
(-23.39)*** -0.7 (-30.29)***
food and lodging sector -0.7 -0.354 -0.938
(-30.52)*** (-9.41)*** (-30.30)***
transport and communication sector -0.264 0.24 -0.456
(-14.15)*** (4.10)*** (-21.91)***
public administration sector 0.429 0.634 0.276
(13.31)*** (12.00)*** (6.57)***
health and education sector 0.214 0.437 -0.0691
(9.88)*** (13.18)*** (-1.87)   
Prob (Formal)
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Table 1.3 – Demographic characteristics 
(%) All Sample block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 block 5
Obs 106984 9390 27160 29916 27590 12903
on leave 1.76 1.51 1.60 1.76 1.93 1.89
formal 51.50 13.27 29.97 50.82 70.75 85.00
age (years) 36.97 42.83 37.35 36.26 35.83 35.96
white 51.51 23.57 37.46 51.72 63.50 75.35
female 41.89 52.58 49.97 41.11 33.90 36.02
education (years) 7.58 2.69 5.32 7.58 9.58 11.65
married 63.63 56.96 61.47 64.84 65.72 65.77
North 10.47 26.73 15.14 9.39 5.16 2.69
Northeast 26.35 56.60 35.41 25.08 16.70 8.80
Southeast 34.37 6.78 26.84 35.25 43.16 49.44
South 17.91 2.16 9.68 17.67 25.15 31.78
Middle-west 10.91 7.72 12.94 12.62 9.83 7.29
metropolitan area 44.82 28.15 37.45 44.98 50.88 59.13
managers 6.51 0.47 1.03 3.96 10.96 18.80
scientists and artists 5.74 0.81 1.86 4.96 9.42 11.45
techinicians 7.39 0.60 2.29 7.49 13.52 9.72
services employees 25.67 30.64 33.84 28.23 20.03 11.02
salesmans 14.11 30.00 23.91 15.80 3.78 0.12
industry employees 32.07 37.44 36.97 37.72 31.14 6.73
other ocupations 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.11
administrative services 8.40 0.04 0.10 1.76 10.96 41.86
industrial sector 18.69 2.81 8.02 19.59 29.45 27.64
civil construction sector 9.60 32.73 19.68 5.40 0.78 0.12
retail sector 24.73 25.23 28.66 29.45 20.94 13.24
food and lodging sector 5.22 9.20 7.33 6.27 2.94 0.36
transport and communication sector 6.73 0.91 4.51 8.60 8.91 6.63
public administration sector 2.45 0.01 0.06 0.70 3.31 11.52
health and education sector 7.35 0.10 0.22 2.97 11.94 27.98
house-keeping 10.66 26.37 23.56 8.32 0.15 0.00
other sectors 14.57 2.65 7.98 18.71 21.60 12.52
Excellent health 22.40 12.10 16.11 21.45 27.38 34.69
Good health 56.27 51.30 55.76 57.67 57.46 55.17
Regular health 18.97 30.72 24.72 18.79 13.94 9.48
Poor health 1.99 5.03 2.88 1.76 1.02 0.51
Very poor health 0.36 0.83 0.53 0.33 0.18 0.13
Probability(Formal)
 
block 1: 0.0 < prob(formal) < 0.2 
block 2: 0.2 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.4 
block 3: 0.4 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.6 
block 4: 0.6 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.8 
block 5: 0.8 ≤ prob(formal) < 1.0 
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Table 1.3a – Demographic characteristics – Females  
(%) FEMALE block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 block 5
Obs 44820 5193 14076 11697 8020 5821
on leave 1.96 1.08 1.73 2.06 2.46 2.41
formal 47.87 10.80 31.28 50.35 70.45 84.93
age (years) 36.69 42.37 37.14 35.82 35.40 34.09
white 52.42 23.47 39.90 61.49 62.04 77.10
female - - - - - -
education (years) 7.96 3.02 6.03 8.43 10.80 12.14
married 55.39 59.68 58.67 55.29 53.43 46.52
North 9.84 27.96 12.08 4.48 7.77 1.91
Northeast 26.69 57.85 33.30 13.96 26.82 8.30
Southeast 34.70 6.74 30.95 43.35 36.08 49.42
South 18.14 2.04 9.63 28.30 19.19 31.23
Middle-west 10.62 5.41 14.04 9.91 10.14 9.14
metropolitan area 45.50 28.23 39.34 49.56 52.17 58.41
managers 4.97 0.12 0.40 3.37 13.68 11.56
scientists and artists 7.11 0.94 1.81 6.59 15.27 15.22
techinicians 7.02 0.12 0.63 4.59 21.12 14.09
services employees 40.37 54.84 57.76 43.94 20.02 6.29
salesmans 16.38 33.49 24.20 17.88 1.30 0.00
industry employees 12.53 10.46 15.13 21.29 5.64 0.02
other ocupations 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
administrative services 11.59 0.04 0.08 2.34 22.89 52.76
industrial sector 16.57 10.94 15.92 24.94 14.90 8.62
civil construction sector 0.41 0.10 0.17 0.35 0.86 0.74
retail sector 21.64 25.84 22.63 22.15 18.55 18.74
food and lodging sector 6.39 10.46 7.95 7.81 3.43 0.24
transport and communication sector 1.60 0.02 0.13 0.82 3.22 5.91
public administration sector 2.35 0.00 0.07 0.91 4.45 9.91
health and education sector 13.07 0.10 0.46 4.70 30.16 48.43
house-keeping 23.60 48.24 43.04 17.06 0.21 0.00
other sectors 14.37 4.31 9.62 21.26 24.21 7.40
Excellent health 20.80 10.63 14.83 22.02 26.30 34.31
Good health 55.22 49.28 54.39 57.23 57.24 55.68
Regular health 21.29 33.72 27.15 18.83 15.16 9.45
Poor health 2.23 5.39 2.97 1.61 1.10 0.40
Very poor health 0.45 0.98 0.65 0.31 0.17 0.17
Probability(Formal)
 
block 1: 0.0 < prob(formal) < 0.2 
block 2: 0.2 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.4 
block 3: 0.4 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.6 
block 4: 0.6 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.8 
block 5: 0.8 ≤ prob(formal) < 1.0 
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Table 1.3b – Demographic characteristics – Males  
(%) MALE block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 block 5
Obs 62164 4884 13461 16908 18126 8771
on leave 1.62 1.88 1.52 1.60 1.63 1.61
formal 54.11 15.40 28.85 50.84 71.06 85.69
age (years) 37.16 42.12 37.51 36.66 36.27 36.70
white 50.85 23.20 36.77 48.08 60.37 73.59
female - - - - - -
education (years) 7.31 2.49 4.96 7.04 8.86 10.95
married 69.57 58.01 64.61 69.12 72.23 79.02
North 10.93 25.90 16.54 11.72 6.06 2.50
Northeast 26.09 54.34 36.78 28.64 17.27 7.29
Southeast 34.13 7.25 24.45 31.48 42.22 52.31
South 17.74 2.13 9.69 14.34 24.02 32.37
Middle-west 11.11 10.38 12.53 13.81 10.43 5.54
metropolitan area 44.34 27.46 36.74 43.55 49.23 56.78
managers 7.62 0.76 1.63 4.76 10.61 19.96
scientists and artists 4.76 0.84 1.68 4.14 7.51 7.15
techinicians 7.65 1.64 4.75 8.95 10.24 7.62
services employees 15.07 2.62 8.72 17.67 20.85 14.84
salesmans 12.48 23.34 22.14 16.16 4.78 0.44
industry employees 46.16 70.76 60.89 46.88 39.47 22.23
other ocupations 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.23 0.17
administrative services 6.10 0.04 0.17 1.34 6.27 27.37
industrial sector 20.23 0.80 2.77 13.16 31.67 47.79
civil construction sector 16.22 64.56 38.86 9.05 0.88 0.08
retail sector 26.95 22.32 34.11 37.22 21.87 9.21
food and lodging sector 4.38 6.96 5.91 6.12 2.94 0.19
transport and communication sector 10.42 2.42 9.19 14.16 11.89 6.52
public administration sector 2.53 0.04 0.06 0.57 2.93 10.66
health and education sector 3.22 0.10 0.15 1.15 4.71 10.58
house-keeping 1.33 0.84 2.29 2.11 0.67 0.00
other sectors 14.72 1.97 6.66 16.44 22.43 14.96
Excellent health 23.55 13.88 17.66 22.08 26.92 33.84
Good health 57.03 54.22 57.24 57.75 57.83 55.22
Regular health 17.29 26.54 22.00 18.15 13.98 10.11
Poor health 1.82 4.75 2.62 1.75 1.03 0.73
Very poor health 0.30 0.57 0.47 0.27 0.22 0.09
Probability(Formal)
 
block 1: 0.0 < prob(formal) < 0.2 
block 2: 0.2 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.4 
block 3: 0.4 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.6 
block 4: 0.6 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.8 
block 5: 0.8 ≤ prob(formal) < 1.0 
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Table 1.4 – Differences between treatment and control groups 
Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
on leave 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
age -1.38 0.00 0.78 0.13 0.52 0.00 -0.38 0.01 -0.76 0.00 0.06 0.81
white 0.14 0.00 -0.01 0.44 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.22 -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.18
female -0.06 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.18 0.00 0.74
education 2.33 0.00 0.05 0.51 0.33 0.00 0.03 0.49 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.09
married 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.21 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.00
North -0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.42
Northeast -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.89 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.89
Southeast 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.39 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.58
South 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.86 0.01 0.55
Middle-west -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.11 0.00 0.25 -0.02 0.02
metropolitan area 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.00
managers 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.48 -0.02 0.02
scientists and artists 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.32 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.48
techinicians 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.11
services employees -0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.01
salesmans -0.09 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.37
industry employees -0.07 0.00 0.12 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.46
other ocupations 0.00 0.00 (dropped) 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.01
administrative services 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.91 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.00
industrial sector 0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00
civil construction sector -0.09 0.00 0.14 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76
retail sector -0.04 0.00 -0.12 0.00 -0.01 0.40 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.50
food and lodging sector -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.60 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.27
transport communic. sector 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.82 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.01
public administration sector 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.15
health and education sector 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.00
house-keeping -0.09 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.07 (dropped) 0.00
other sectors 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.13 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.09
All Sample
Probability (Formal)
block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 block 5
 
block 1: 0.0 < prob(formal) < 0.2 
block 2: 0.2 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.4 
block 3: 0.4 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.6 
block 4: 0.6 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.8 
block 5: 0.8 ≤ prob(formal) < 1.0 
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Table 1.4a – Differences between treatment and control groups - Female 
Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
on leave 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00
age -1.92 0.00 1.21 0.09 0.02 0.92 -0.71 0.00 -0.07 0.79 0.30 0.41
white 0.15 0.00 -0.03 0.17 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.68 -0.02 0.16 -0.01 0.34
education 2.61 0.00 0.03 0.83 0.14 0.03 -0.02 0.79 0.22 0.00 0.14 0.11
married -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.48 -0.01 0.55 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.24
North -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.85 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.84
Northeast -0.11 0.00 -0.04 0.10 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.42
Southeast 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.45 -0.01 0.48
South 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.59 0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.20
Middle-west 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.96 -0.01 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.92
metropolitan area 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.14
managers 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.89 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.02
scientists and artists 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.45 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.80
techinicias 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.24
services employees -0.17 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.15 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.06
salesmans -0.11 0.00 -0.17 0.00 -0.01 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.87 (dropped) 0.00
industry employees -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.32
other ocupations 0.00 0.16 (dropped) 0.00 (dropped) 0.00 (dropped) 0.00 (dropped) 0.00 (dropped) 0.00
administrative services 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00
industrial sector -0.01 0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.21 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03
civil construction sector 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.35
retail sector -0.02 0.00 -0.15 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.17
food and lodging sector -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.93
transport communic. sector 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.43 0.02 0.04
public administration sector 0.03 0.00 (dropped) 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.16
health and education sector 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.68 -0.05 0.01
house-keeping -0.17 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.56 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.17 (dropped) 0.00
other sectors 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.83 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.28 0.01 0.19
Probability (Formal)
All Sample block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 block 5
 
block 1: 0.0 < prob(formal) < 0.2 
block 2: 0.2 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.4 
block 3: 0.4 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.6 
block 4: 0.6 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.8 
block 5: 0.8 ≤ prob(formal) < 1.0 
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Table 1.4b – Differences between treatment and control groups - Male 
Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
on leave 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
age -1.05 0.00 -0.01 0.98 0.77 0.00 -0.23 0.23 -0.56 0.00 -0.83 0.01
white 0.13 0.00 -0.02 0.27 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.26 -0.01 0.37 0.00 0.97
education 2.20 0.00 0.14 0.15 0.44 0.00 0.04 0.48 0.06 0.33 0.19 0.04
married 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.77 -0.01 0.34 0.00 0.76 0.03 0.04
North -0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.66 -0.01 0.11 0.01 0.19 0.00 0.90
Northeast -0.12 0.00 0.01 0.56 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.60
Southeast 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.28 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.21 0.02 0.14
South 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.43 0.01 0.27 0.00 0.89
Middle-west -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.22 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.45 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.01
metropolitan area 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.20 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.00
managers 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.35 -0.03 0.02
scientists and artists 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.58 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.79
techinicias 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.60 -0.01 0.14 0.00 0.96
services employees 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.89 -0.01 0.16 -0.03 0.02
salesmans -0.08 0.00 -0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.31 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.41
industry employees -0.13 0.00 0.11 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.88
other ocupations 0.00 0.01 (dropped) 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.24 -0.01 0.01
administrative services 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.78 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00
industrial sector 0.14 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00
civil construction sector -0.17 0.00 0.13 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00
retail sector -0.06 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.01 0.32 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.88
food and lodging sector -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.66 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
transport communic. sector 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.28 0.00 0.42 0.02 0.02
public administration sector 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.15
health and education sector 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02
house-keeping -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.79 -0.01 0.00 (dropped) 0.00
other sectors 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.44 -0.01 0.14 -0.03 0.01
Probability (Formal)
All Sample block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 block 5
 
block 1: 0.0 < prob(formal) < 0.2 
block 2: 0.2 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.4 
block 3: 0.4 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.6 
block 4: 0.6 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.8 
block 5: 0.8 ≤ prob(formal) < 1.0 
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Graph 1 - Kernel Density - Prob(formal job) for workers in the formal sector and workers in the informal sector
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Graph 1a - Kernel Density - Prob(formal job) for female workers in the formal sector and female workers in the informal sector
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Graph 1b - Kernel Density - Prob(formal job) for male workers in the formal sector and male workers in the informal sector
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Table 1.5 – Probability to take leave 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
all sample block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 block 5
formal workers 0.465 0.435 0.448 0.512 0.449 0.347
(22.01)*** (5.43)*** (11.21)*** (12.47)*** (8.91)*** (3.63)***
female 0.0852 -0.308 -0.0308 0.153 0.155 0.286
(4.37)*** (-4.34)*** (-0.77) (4.13)*** (4.10)*** (5.27)***
good health 0.104 0.261 0.102 0.134 0.0486 0.0886
(3.71)*** -1.72 -1.5 (2.37)* -1 -1.4
regular health 0.532 0.537 0.464 0.583 0.582 0.492
(17.63)*** (3.51)*** (6.66)*** (9.73)*** (10.74)*** (5.90)***
poor health 1.092 0.9 0.965 1.177 1.326 1.442
(23.42)*** (5.13)*** (10.39)*** (12.84)*** (13.30)*** (7.73)***
really poor health 1.223 0.71 0.816 1.598 1.288 2.107
(13.61)*** (2.11)* (4.36)*** (9.98)*** (5.91)*** (6.73)***
_cons -2.676 -2.515 -2.569 -2.784 -2.675 -2.66
(-87.16)*** (-17.26)*** (-38.38)*** (-44.98)*** (-43.49)*** (-25.15)***
N 106984 9390 27160 29916 27590 12903
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
block 1: 0.0 < prob(formal) < 0.2 
block 2: 0.2 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.4 
block 3: 0.4 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.6 
block 4: 0.6 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.8 
block 5: 0.8 ≤ prob(formal) < 1.0 
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Table 1.5a – Probability to take leave - Female 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
females block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 block 5
formal workers 0.516 0.706 0.499 0.411 0.461 0.381
(16.66)*** (5.97)*** (9.28)*** (7.01)*** (5.46)*** (2.87)** 
good health 0.0762 0.439 0.182 -0.0214 0.0187 0.137
-1.87 -1.34 -1.89 (-0.28) -0.24 -1.59
regular health 0.421 0.786 0.402 0.446 0.434 0.479
(9.50)*** (2.43)* (4.04)*** (5.46)*** (4.79)*** (4.13)***
poor health 0.862 0.896 0.899 1.006 0.958 1.203
(11.87)*** (2.49)* (6.77)*** (7.18)*** (5.12)*** (3.78)***
really poor health 1.171 1.195 1.14 1.285 0.595 2.399
(9.35)*** (2.60)** (5.50)*** (4.83)*** -1.15 (5.84)***
_cons -2.564 -3.055 -2.611 -2.441 -2.454 -2.486
(-60.44)*** (-9.63)*** (-28.07)*** (-31.92)*** (-25.51)*** (-17.52)***
N 44820 5193 14076 11697 8020 5821
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
block 1: 0.0 < prob(formal) < 0.2 
block 2: 0.2 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.4 
block 3: 0.4 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.6 
block 4: 0.6 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.8 
block 5: 0.8 ≤ prob(formal) < 1.0 
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Table 1.5b – Probability to take leave - Male 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
male block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 block 5
formal workers 0.417 0.383 0.457 0.489 0.459 0.409
(14.47)*** (3.81)*** (7.79)*** (8.69)*** (6.75)*** (3.12)** 
good health 0.126 0.196 0.0797 0.13 0.126 0.0512
(3.26)** -1.2 -0.81 -1.66 -1.85 -0.6
regular health 0.627 0.412 0.558 0.617 0.669 0.677
(15.15)*** (2.44)* (5.57)*** (7.49)*** (8.96)*** (6.74)***
poor health 1.268 0.866 1.118 1.276 1.505 1.479
(20.60)*** (4.35)*** (8.51)*** (10.49)*** (12.05)*** (7.51)***
really poor health 1.27 0.881 1.509 1.602 1.614
(9.82)*** (3.24)** (6.20)*** (6.77)*** (3.32)***
_cons -2.693 -2.455 -2.63 -2.75 -2.778 -2.698
(-66.59)*** (-16.03)*** (-28.43)*** (-34.11)*** (-33.14)*** (-19.00)***
N 62164 4856 13461 16908 18126 8771
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
block 1: 0.0 < prob(formal) < 0.2 
block 2: 0.2 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.4 
block 3: 0.4 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.6 
block 4: 0.6 ≤ prob(formal) < 0.8 
block 5: 0.8 ≤ prob(formal) < 1.0 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.6 – Average Treatment Effect – Nearest Neighbor Matching Estimator 
n. treat. n. contr. ATT Std. Err. t
55079 26140 0.017 0.001 14.979
Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual
nearest neighbour matches  
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Table 1.7 – Difference in difference estimates 
(a) (b)
Post * Treatment 0.107*** 0.107** 
-3.33 -3.24
Post 0.108*** 0.115***
-4.13 -4.3
Treatment 0.274*** 0.352***
-11.03 -13.61
good health 0.0913***
-4.17
regular health 0.523***
-22.36
poor health 1.075***
-30.17
really poor health 1.197***
-17.63
_cons -2.447*** -2.740***
(-121.91)   (-99.45)   
N 199750 199750
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Prob (on leave)
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Table 1.8 – Oaxaca Blinder Decomposition 
"On leave" Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Differential
Prediction 1998 0.0112 0.0003 0.00
Prediction 2003 0.0176 0.0004 0.00
Difference -0.0064 0.0005 0.00
Decompasition
Endowments -0.0008 0.0003 0.00
Coefficients -0.0055 0.0006 0.00
Interaction -0.0001 0.0004 0.86
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Chapter 2 Tables and Charts 
Table 2.1 – Summary Statistics – Rural Children 
Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Children between 10 and 14 years old
Child Labor 12,942           0.36 6,204             0.22 6,738             0.49
Literacy 12,940           0.68 6,204             0.75 6,736             0.61
Attendance 12,942           0.70 6,204             0.73 6,738             0.68
Age 12,942           12.14 6,204             12.13 6,738             12.14
Female 12,942           0.48 6,204             - 6,738             -
White 12,942           0.35 6,204             0.36 6,738             0.34
Education 12,942           1.82 6,204             2.06 6,738             1.61
Family Size 12,942           6.31 6,204             6.32 6,738             6.29
Number of Child in the family 12,942           2.70 6,204             2.72 6,738             2.69
Children between 6 and 14 years old
Literacy 19,890           0.53 9,627             0.58 10,263           0.49
Attendance 19,898           0.69 9,630             0.71 10,268           0.67
Age 19,898           10.55 9,630             10.52 10,268           10.58
Female 19,898           0.48 9,630             - 10,268           -
White 19,898           0.34 9,630             0.35 10,268           0.33
Education 16,102           1.51 7,760             1.70 8,342             1.34
Family Size 19,898           6.38 9,630             6.39 10,268           6.37
Number of Child in the family 19,898           2.85 9,630             2.86 10,268           2.84
All Sample Girls Boys
 
 
Table 2.1a – Summary Statistics – Rural Children – Socioeconomic Groups 
Obs Child Labor Literacy Attendance Age Female White Education Family Size
Number of Child in 
the family
Children between 10 and 14 years old
All sample 12,942 0.36 0.68 0.70 12.14 0.48 0.35 1.82 6.31 2.70
SES 1 3,128 0.44 0.53 0.66 12.08 0.47 0.24 1.15 7.85 3.68
SES 2 2,486 0.40 0.60 0.68 12.12 0.47 0.30 1.39 6.14 2.66
SES 3 2,026 0.40 0.66 0.65 12.13 0.46 0.30 1.65 5.82 2.51
SES 4 1,928 0.32 0.83 0.74 12.18 0.48 0.46 2.55 6.16 2.41
SES 5 1,476 0.29 0.94 0.84 12.19 0.50 0.61 3.34 5.49 2.03
Girls 6,204 0.22 0.75 0.73 12.13 1.00 0.36 2.06 6.32 2.72
SES 1 1,481 0.27 0.62 0.70 12.06 1.00 0.25 1.39 7.95 3.80
SES 2 1,162 0.23 0.69 0.73 12.11 1.00 0.30 1.64 6.10 2.63
SES 3 940 0.24 0.74 0.68 12.11 1.00 0.32 1.91 5.84 2.49
SES 4 935 0.20 0.87 0.74 12.21 1.00 0.47 2.76 6.23 2.43
SES 5 741 0.20 0.95 0.84 12.17 1.00 0.62 3.43 5.46 2.02
Boys 6,738 0.49 0.61 0.68 12.14 0.00 0.34 1.61 6.29 2.69
SES 1 1,647 0.60 0.45 0.62 12.10 0.00 0.23 0.93 7.77 3.57
SES 2 1,324 0.55 0.52 0.64 12.13 0.00 0.30 1.16 6.18 2.68
SES 3 1,086 0.54 0.58 0.63 12.15 0.00 0.29 1.42 5.81 2.53
SES 4 993 0.44 0.79 0.75 12.15 0.00 0.46 2.35 6.09 2.38
SES 5 735 0.39 0.93 0.84 12.21 0.00 0.60 3.24 5.53 2.04
Children between 6 and 14 years old
All sample 19,890 0.53 0.69 10.55 0.48 0.34 1.51 6.38 2.85
SES 1 4,962 0.39 0.63 10.43 0.48 0.24 0.95 7.95 3.86
SES 2 3,182 0.46 0.66 10.54 0.47 0.29 1.11 6.17 2.78
SES 3 3,102 0.51 0.64 10.56 0.47 0.29 1.36 5.89 2.66
SES 4 2,907 0.69 0.75 10.64 0.48 0.45 2.14 6.21 2.54
SES 5 2,200 0.82 0.84 10.68 0.50 0.60 2.86 5.52 2.14
Girls 9,630 0.58 0.71 10.52 1.00 0.35 1.70 6.39 2.86
SES 1 2,404 0.44 0.66 10.35 1.00 0.25 1.15 8.00 3.94
SES 2 1,811 0.52 0.68 10.50 1.00 0.29 1.29 6.15 2.77
SES 3 1,454 0.58 0.66 10.51 1.00 0.30 1.57 5.87 2.62
SES 4 1,399 0.72 0.75 10.69 1.00 0.45 2.32 6.27 2.56
SES 5 1,094 0.83 0.84 10.70 1.00 0.61 2.96 5.51 2.13
Boys 10,268 0.49 0.67 10.58 0.00 0.33 1.34 6.37 2.84
SES 1 2,558 0.33 0.59 10.50 0.00 0.23 0.77 7.91 3.79
SES 2 2,006 0.40 0.64 10.59 0.00 0.29 0.94 6.20 2.79
SES 3 1,648 0.46 0.62 10.60 0.00 0.28 1.17 5.92 2.70
SES 4 1,508 0.66 0.75 10.58 0.00 0.45 1.97 6.16 2.53
SES 5 1,107 0.81 0.84 10.66 0.00 0.60 2.77 5.54 2.14
Obs: SES stands for socioeconomic index
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Table 2.2 – Family Income Regression 
Outcome
Log Per Capita Family Income (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Female Treatment old rule -0.0596 0.0678 0.0311 -0.0513 -0.0236 -0.0312
(0.00982)*** (0.0279)* -0.0237 (0.0240)* -0.0277 -0.03
Male Treatment old rule -0.026 -0.0593 0.0749 0.012 0.0871 0.0178
(0.00958)** (0.0265)* (0.0228)** -0.0235 (0.0269)** -0.0306
Female Treatment new rule -0.047 -0.0155 -0.0222 -0.0485 -0.141 -0.0647
(0.00753)*** -0.0211 -0.0161 (0.0170)** (0.0193)*** (0.0213)** 
Male Treatment new rule -0.0262 0.0258 0.00243 -0.103 -0.0395 -0.00674
(0.00961)** -0.0235 -0.02 (0.0209)*** -0.0233 -0.0271
Post -0.107 -0.149 -0.0892 -0.125 -0.185 -0.194
(0.00761)*** (0.0165)*** (0.0171)*** (0.0184)*** (0.0186)*** (0.0194)***
Female Treatment old rule x Post (a) 0.332 0.268 0.206 0.291 0.278 0.224
(0.0112)*** (0.0294)*** (0.0290)*** (0.0287)*** (0.0310)*** (0.0313)***
Male Treatment old rule x Post (b) 0.296 0.39 0.225 0.265 0.135 0.146
(0.0105)*** (0.0266)*** (0.0251)*** (0.0259)*** (0.0283)*** (0.0316)***
Female Treatment new rule x Post (c) 0.162 0.125 0.144 0.0779 0.244 0.191
(0.0104)*** (0.0264)*** (0.0240)*** (0.0248)** (0.0262)*** (0.0275)***
Male Treatment new rule x Post (d) 0.147 0.264 0.0918 0.2 0.111 0.0217
(0.0129)*** (0.0288)*** (0.0289)** (0.0297)*** (0.0313)*** -0.0334
N 114900 17891 18197 18018 18229 18371
standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
All Sample Socioeconomic Index Quintile
 
Obs: control variables are household head’s education, gender, race, age and age squared; oldest member’s 
education and age; dummy for head-oldest member; age; age squared; race; gender; family size; number of 
children. 
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Table 2.3 – Child Labor – Socio Economic Index  
Outcome
Child Labor (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Female Treatment old rule 0.00586 0.0976 -0.0119 0.0304 -0.00847 -0.0224
-0.0195 (0.0482)* -0.054 -0.0508 -0.05 -0.0573
Male Treatment old rule -0.00166 0.11 0.0218 -0.0872 -0.0521 0.0319
-0.018 (0.0425)** -0.0437 -0.0461 -0.0473 -0.0594
Female Treatment new rule 0.0391 0.0867 -0.0357 0.122 0.0429 0.0758
(0.0139)** (0.0369)* -0.029 (0.0347)*** -0.036 -0.0415
Male Treatment new rule -0.00837 0.00512 -0.00655 -0.0456 -0.0652 0.0225
-0.0163 -0.0368 -0.0348 -0.0395 -0.0377 -0.0516
Post 0.105 0.11 0.0876 0.0853 0.13 0.139
(0.0117)*** (0.0238)*** (0.0264)*** (0.0300)** (0.0298)*** (0.0322)***
Female Treatment old rule x Post (a) -0.0038 -0.0112 -0.0863 0.00269 0.0128 0.0771
-0.0217 -0.0477 -0.0625 -0.0585 -0.0568 -0.0578
Male Treatment old rule x Post (b) 0.00123 -0.013 0.0606 0.0304 -0.00846 0.0508
-0.0196 -0.0436 -0.0477 -0.0508 -0.0519 -0.0653
Female Treatment new rule x Post (c) -0.0479 -0.121 -0.00403 -0.0308 -0.069 -0.0789
(0.0196)* (0.0469)** -0.0457 -0.0496 -0.0495 -0.0572
Male Treatment new rule x Post (d) -0.00377 0.0114 0.0519 -0.0397 0.0446 -0.025
-0.0222 -0.0449 -0.0524 -0.0544 -0.0536 -0.0653
N 12940 3128 2486 2026 1927 1476
standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
All Sample Socioeconomic Index Quintile
 
Obs: control variables are household head’s education, gender, race, age and age squared; oldest member’s 
education and age; dummy for head-oldest member; age; age squared; race; gender; family size; number of 
children. 
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Table 2.3a – Child Labor – Girls – Socioeconomic Index  
Outcome
Child Labor - Girls (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Female Treatment old rule 0.000667 0.0948 -0.052 0.0747 -0.0659 0.014
-0.0251 -0.0666 -0.0798 -0.0645 -0.0578 -0.0737
Male Treatment old rule -0.0454 0.0795 -0.0802 -0.119 -0.115 -0.0317
(0.0229)* -0.0569 -0.0594 -0.0617 (0.0566)* -0.0693
Female Treatment new rule 0.0232 0.112 -0.072 0.114 -0.0205 0.0402
-0.0175 (0.0506)* (0.0354)* (0.0494)* -0.0458 -0.0499
Male Treatment new rule -0.034 0.00122 -0.0661 -0.0722 -0.0524 -0.0165
-0.0202 -0.0484 -0.0436 -0.051 -0.0434 -0.0649
Post 0.0997 0.146 0.0625 0.0627 0.119 0.0794
(0.0155)*** (0.0332)*** -0.0365 -0.0401 (0.0386)** -0.0421
Female Treatment old rule x Post (a) -0.0148 -0.0377 -0.126 -0.00977 0.0417 0.0842
-0.0281 -0.0643 -0.0886 -0.077 -0.0702 -0.0749
Male Treatment old rule x Post (b) 0.0223 0.00758 0.208 0.0192 -0.0281 0.0371
-0.0253 -0.0593 (0.0657)** -0.0683 -0.0627 -0.0768
Female Treatment new rule x Post (c) -0.0431 -0.17 -0.0622 0.00152 -0.0224 0.0169
-0.0257 (0.0648)** -0.0605 -0.0721 -0.0632 -0.0745
Male Treatment new rule x Post (d) 0.00342 -0.0026 0.0985 0.0234 -0.0127 0.00977
-0.0287 -0.0609 -0.0704 -0.0732 -0.0652 -0.0841
N 6202 1481 1162 940 934 741
standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
All Sample Socioeconomic Index Quintile
 
Obs: control variables are household head’s education, gender, race, age and age squared; oldest member’s 
education and age; dummy for head-oldest member; age; age squared; race; gender; family size; number of 
children. 
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Table 2.3b – Child Labor – Boys – Socioeconomic Index  
Outcome
Child Labor - Boys (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Female Treatment old rule 0.00475 0.0929 0.0244 -0.0357 0.026 -0.0542
-0.0296 -0.0686 -0.0737 -0.0766 -0.0804 -0.0894
Male Treatment old rule 0.0392 0.135 0.108 -0.0672 -0.00835 0.127
-0.0273 (0.0628)* -0.0641 -0.0661 -0.0722 -0.104
Female Treatment new rule 0.0543 0.0624 0.00298 0.119 0.106 0.114
(0.0212)* -0.0532 -0.045 (0.0483)* -0.0556 -0.0691
Male Treatment new rule 0.0165 0.015 0.0306 -0.0151 -0.0715 0.0789
-0.0253 -0.0544 -0.0539 -0.0606 -0.0597 -0.081
Post 0.111 0.0783 0.109 0.0916 0.137 0.221
(0.0171)*** (0.0338)* (0.0377)** (0.0439)* (0.0444)** (0.0491)***
Female Treatment old rule x Post (a) 0.00764 0.00258 -0.0551 0.046 0.00709 0.05
-0.033 -0.07 -0.0869 -0.0874 -0.0915 -0.0908
Male Treatment old rule x Post (b) -0.0176 -0.0209 -0.0617 0.0573 0.0123 0.0301
-0.0294 -0.0636 -0.0675 -0.0719 -0.0785 -0.113
Female Treatment new rule x Post (c) -0.0557 -0.0831 0.0239 -0.0557 -0.118 -0.182
-0.0291 -0.0671 -0.067 -0.0681 -0.0765 (0.0888)*  
Male Treatment new rule x Post (d) -0.0131 0.0249 0.0172 -0.087 0.0931 -0.0987
-0.0333 -0.065 -0.0776 -0.0802 -0.0849 -0.0999
N 6738 1647 1324 1086 993 735
standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
All Sample Socioeconomic Index Quintile
 
Obs: control variables are household head’s education, gender, race, age and age squared; oldest member’s 
education and age; dummy for head-oldest member; age; age squared; race; gender; family size; number of 
children. 
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Table 2.4 – Literacy – Socioeconomic Index  
Outcome
Literacy (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Female Treatment old rule -0.0242 0.00209 -0.0722 0.0119 -0.0213 0.0602
-0.0146 -0.0333 (0.0360)* -0.0391 -0.036 -0.0332
Male Treatment old rule -0.0445 -0.0186 -0.0772 -0.0271 -0.0832 -0.00905
(0.0136)** -0.0306 (0.0316)* -0.036 (0.0343)* -0.0404
Female Treatment new rule -0.0363 0.00892 -0.0777 0.0135 -0.0741 -0.0335
(0.0110)*** -0.0277 (0.0229)*** -0.026 (0.0289)* -0.0286
Male Treatment new rule -0.036 -0.0359 -0.0389 -0.0615 -0.0532 0.0362
(0.0130)** -0.027 -0.0285 (0.0307)* -0.029 -0.0363
Post 0.0225 0.0662 0.0136 0.0381 0.00485 0.0265
(0.00901)* (0.0178)*** -0.0211 -0.0234 -0.0215 -0.02
Female Treatment old rule x Post (a) 0.0106 0.0123 0.0509 -0.0581 0.00603 -0.0473
-0.016 -0.0343 -0.0447 -0.0438 -0.0388 -0.0329
Male Treatment old rule x Post (b) 0.0264 0.0041 0.014 0.0662 0.00156 0.004
-0.0148 -0.0315 -0.0351 -0.0396 -0.0389 -0.0432
Female Treatment new rule x Post (c) 0.0232 -0.0193 0.0706 -0.0476 0.0594 -0.00603
-0.0151 -0.0352 (0.0358)* -0.0375 -0.0376 -0.0363
Male Treatment new rule x Post (d) 0.0503 0.0919 0.0232 0.0506 0.0262 0.00874
(0.0172)** (0.0332)** -0.0413 -0.0425 -0.04 -0.0427
19887 4962 3813 3100 2905 2200
standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
All Sample Socioeconomic Index Quintile
 
Obs: control variables are household head’s education, gender, race, age and age squared; oldest member’s 
education and age; dummy for head-oldest member; age; age squared; race; gender; family size; number of 
children. 
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Table 2.4a – Literacy – Girls – Socioeconomic Index  
Outcome
Literacy - Girls (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Female Treatment old rule -0.0286 0.0277 -0.0644 -0.0117 -0.0388 0.0287
-0.0202 -0.0494 -0.0506 -0.0556 -0.05 -0.0478
Male Treatment old rule -0.0498 0.031 -0.0597 -0.0648 -0.0821 -0.0233
(0.0190)** -0.044 -0.0441 -0.0519 -0.0501 -0.0522
Female Treatment new rule -0.0326 0.021 -0.0691 -0.0133 -0.0673 -0.0427
(0.0152)* -0.0372 (0.0330)* -0.0378 -0.0393 -0.0392
Male Treatment new rule -0.0294 0.000462 0.0151 -0.105 -0.0456 0.0342
-0.0184 -0.0411 -0.0408 (0.0426)* -0.0419 -0.0511
Post 0.031 0.0758 0.0201 0.0394 0.0291 0.0326
(0.0125)* (0.0252)** -0.0301 -0.0323 -0.0296 -0.0284
Female Treatment old rule x Post (a) 0.0141 0.0362 0.0529 -0.0995 0.021 -0.0253
-0.0219 -0.0492 -0.0631 -0.0607 -0.0519 -0.0444
Male Treatment old rule x Post (b) 0.0231 -0.0155 -0.00325 0.0435 0.00534 0.0174
-0.0207 -0.0448 -0.0511 -0.0573 -0.0558 -0.0562
Female Treatment new rule x Post (c) 0.0165 -0.0314 0.0832 -0.0411 0.0639 -0.0128
-0.021 -0.048 -0.052 -0.0537 -0.0497 -0.051
Male Treatment new rule x Post (d) 0.0627 0.0953 -0.0128 0.0739 0.0399 0.0352
(0.0241)** -0.0491 -0.059 -0.0612 -0.0551 -0.0568
N 9625 2404 1810 1453 1398 1094
standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
All Sample Socioeconomic Index Quintile
 
Obs: control variables are household head’s education, gender, race, age and age squared; oldest member’s 
education and age; dummy for head-oldest member; age; age squared; race; gender; family size; number of 
children. 
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Table 2.4b – Literacy – Boys – Socioeconomic Index  
Outcome
Literacy - Boys (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Female Treatment old rule -0.0204 -0.023 -0.0704 0.0217 -0.000939 0.0767
-0.0209 -0.0447 -0.0508 -0.0554 -0.0524 -0.0469
Male Treatment old rule -0.0404 -0.0661 -0.0893 0.00467 -0.0907 -0.0131
(0.0193)* -0.0428 (0.0452)* -0.0499 -0.0478 -0.0638
Female Treatment new rule -0.0398 -0.00484 -0.0867 0.0348 -0.0813 -0.0286
(0.0156)* -0.04 (0.0317)** -0.0358 -0.0425 -0.0414
Male Treatment new rule -0.0447 -0.0697 -0.0856 -0.0198 -0.0651 0.0319
(0.0183)* -0.0357 (0.0396)* -0.0439 -0.0404 -0.0515
Post 0.014 0.0606 0.00925 0.0326 -0.0139 0.0137
-0.0129 (0.0250)* -0.0294 -0.0337 -0.031 -0.0282
Female Treatment old rule x Post (a) 0.00674 -0.0134 0.0545 -0.00548 -0.0249 -0.0606
-0.0233 -0.0477 -0.0625 -0.0638 -0.058 -0.0502
Male Treatment old rule x Post (b) 0.0292 0.0194 0.0101 0.0931 0.0016 0.00666
-0.0209 -0.044 -0.0487 -0.0548 -0.0546 -0.0667
Female Treatment new rule x Post (c) 0.0308 -0.00593 0.0694 -0.0571 0.0497 0.00761
-0.0215 -0.0506 -0.0493 -0.0526 -0.0563 -0.0519
Male Treatment new rule x Post (d) 0.0401 0.0825 0.0544 0.0322 0.0103 -0.00635
-0.0244 -0.0451 -0.0577 -0.0593 -0.0584 -0.0628
N 10262 2558 2003 1647 1507 1106
standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
All Sample Socioeconomic Index Quintile
 
Obs: control variables are household head’s education, gender, race, age and age squared; oldest member’s 
education and age; dummy for head-oldest member; age; age squared; race; gender; family size; number of 
children. 
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Table 2.5 – Attendance – Socioeconomic Index  
Outcome
Attendance (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Female Treatment old rule 0.00414 0.00733 0.0705 0.0487 0.0152 -0.0389
-0.0156 -0.0372 -0.0394 -0.0414 -0.039 -0.0426
Male Treatment old rule 0.00394 -0.0378 0.0575 0.0164 0.0747 -0.0831
-0.0147 -0.035 -0.034 -0.0393 (0.0353)* -0.0462
Female Treatment new rule -0.0112 -0.00553 -0.0124 0.0141 -0.0501 -0.0206
-0.0119 -0.0312 -0.0257 -0.0288 -0.0326 -0.031
Male Treatment new rule -0.026 -0.0864 0.00369 -0.0153 -0.00933 0.00609
-0.0141 (0.0312)** -0.0298 -0.0341 -0.0336 -0.0362
Post 0.0462 0.0332 0.0554 0.073 0.0382 0.0451
(0.00952)*** -0.0196 (0.0217)* (0.0252)** -0.023 -0.023
Female Treatment old rule x Post (a) 0.0283 0.0274 0.0263 0.0267 0.0287 0.0229
-0.0167 -0.0377 -0.0452 -0.045 -0.0407 -0.0402
Male Treatment old rule x Post (b) 0.0378 0.109 0.0282 -0.0163 -0.0235 0.0856
(0.0156)*  (0.0353)** -0.0368 -0.0432 -0.0384 -0.0469
Female Treatment new rule x Post (c) -0.0000367 0.009 0.0176 -0.0543 0.0512 -0.0404
-0.0162 -0.0389 -0.038 -0.0412 -0.041 -0.0399
Male Treatment new rule x Post (d) 0.0488 0.119 0.0142 0.0152 0.0491 0.0143
(0.0183)** (0.0373)** -0.0428 -0.0461 -0.0434 -0.0436
N 19895 4963 3817 3102 2905 2201
standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
All Sample Socioeconomic Index Quintile
 
Obs: control variables are household head’s education, gender, race, age and age squared; oldest member’s 
education and age; dummy for head-oldest member; age; age squared; race; gender; family size; number of 
children. 
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Table 2.5a – Attendance – Girls – Socioeconomic Index  
Outcome
Attendance - Girls (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Female Treatment old rule -0.0265 -0.0321 0.06 0.0516 -0.0107 -0.104
-0.0219 -0.0521 -0.0564 -0.0568 -0.0573 -0.0622
Male Treatment old rule -0.00406 -0.0392 0.082 0.0123 0.0479 -0.0952
-0.0211 -0.0487 -0.0482 -0.0595 -0.055 -0.0651
Female Treatment new rule 0.00729 -0.014 0.0234 0.0329 -0.0272 -0.0608
-0.0169 -0.044 -0.0361 -0.0433 -0.0455 -0.0444
Male Treatment new rule -0.0148 -0.0496 0.00408 0.00338 -0.0138 0.0305
-0.0201 -0.045 -0.0427 -0.0479 -0.0495 -0.0513
Post 0.0421 0.00881 0.0721 0.0976 0.0232 0.0388
(0.0136)** -0.0279 (0.0313)* (0.0364)** -0.0331 -0.0318
Female Treatment old rule x Post (a) 0.0646 0.112 0.0325 0.039 0.0759 0.0667
(0.0231)** (0.0527)* -0.0632 -0.0611 -0.0572 -0.0578
Male Treatment old rule x Post (b) 0.0517 0.111 0.0088 0.00406 0.0299 0.108
(0.0220)*  (0.0492)* -0.0519 -0.0629 -0.0557 -0.0644
Female Treatment new rule x Post (c) 0.00928 0.0582 0.0348 -0.0176 0.0229 -0.0379
-0.0226 -0.0544 -0.0526 -0.0591 -0.0574 -0.0584
Male Treatment new rule x Post (d) 0.0437 0.0949 0.0334 -0.0192 0.0676 -0.0147
-0.0258 -0.0534 -0.0604 -0.0661 -0.062 -0.062
N 9628 2405 1811 1454 1398 1094
standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
All Sample Socioeconomic Index Quintile
 
Obs: control variables are household head’s education, gender, race, age and age squared; oldest member’s 
education and age; dummy for head-oldest member; age; age squared; race; gender; family size; number of 
children. 
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Table 2.5b – Attendance – Boys – Socioeconomic Index  
Outcome
Attendance - Boys (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Female Treatment old rule 0.0325 0.0458 0.0885 0.0487 0.0437 0.00969
-0.0223 -0.0531 -0.055 -0.06 -0.0535 -0.0578
Male Treatment old rule 0.00986 -0.0357 0.0351 0.0189 0.0967 -0.0778
-0.0205 -0.0504 -0.0484 -0.0523 (0.0461)* -0.0656
Female Treatment new rule -0.0288 0.00367 -0.0461 -0.000932 -0.0731 0.0137
-0.0169 -0.0445 -0.0366 -0.0389 -0.0466 -0.0433
Male Treatment new rule -0.0389 -0.12 0.00446 -0.0285 -0.00537 -0.0139
-0.0198 (0.0433)** -0.0416 -0.0488 -0.0457 -0.0511
Post 0.0484 0.0567 0.0419 0.0487 0.0543 0.0478
(0.0133)*** (0.0276)* -0.0299 -0.0353 -0.0319 -0.0335
Female Treatment old rule x Post (a) -0.00648 -0.0581 0.023 0.013 -0.0232 -0.000429
-0.0242 -0.0543 -0.0648 -0.0662 -0.0583 -0.0554
Male Treatment old rule x Post (b) 0.0262 0.11 0.0316 -0.0253 -0.0683 0.0672
-0.0221 (0.0507)* -0.0519 -0.0597 -0.0535 -0.0686
Female Treatment new rule x Post (c) -0.00622 -0.0399 0.0095 -0.0833 0.082 -0.0304
-0.023 -0.0557 -0.0544 -0.0576 -0.0591 -0.055
Male Treatment new rule x Post (d) 0.0555 0.14 -0.00546 0.0456 0.0336 0.0378
(0.0259)*  (0.0522)** -0.0605 -0.0645 -0.0612 -0.062
N 10267 2558 2006 1648 1507 1107
standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
All Sample Socioeconomic Index Quintile
 
Obs: control variables are household head’s education, gender, race, age and age squared; oldest member’s 
education and age; dummy for head-oldest member; age; age squared; race; gender; family size; number of 
children. 
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Chapter 3 Tables and Charts 
Table 3.1 – Summary Statistics 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Portuguese Proficiency 11,011 145.76 42.92 10,892 169.79 46.75
Mathematics Proficiency 10,245 159.56 45.52 10,913 177.07 46.65
Lagged Portuguese Proficiency 11,033 123.92 40.34 11,011 145.76 42.92
Lagged Mathematics Proficiency 10,995 129.95 44.66 10,245 159.56 45.52
Father´s Education 9,435 4.18 2.04 10,622 4.30 2.10
Age 11,418 9.56 0.79 11,418 10.56 0.79
Female 11,418 0.46 0.50 11,418 0.46 0.50
White 11,418 0.40 0.49 11,418 0.40 0.49
2008 2009
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Table 3.2 – Delta Proficiency Level 
2008 2009 average
increment
All sample
mathematics 28.17 18.93 23.56
portuguese 22.12 23.57 22.84
Low Achievement Students
mathematics 49.19 38.41 43.67
portuguese 39.49 35.46 37.51
High Achievement Students
mathematics 10.47 6.87 8.70
portuguese 8.66 15.18 11.92
Medium Achievement Students
mathematics 27.63 15.53 21.63
portuguese 20.27 22.07 21.17
First Quartile of Class Distribution
mathematics 43.40 32.08 37.56
portuguese 35.33 32.42 33.86
Second Quartile of Class Distribution
mathematics 32.26 18.18 25.34
portuguese 26.12 24.42 25.28
Third Quartile of Class Distribution
mathematics 21.81 13.22 17.50
portuguese 15.30 19.37 17.33
Fourth Quartile of Class Distribution
mathematics 8.80 4.79 6.90
portuguese 5.89 13.35 9.50
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Table 3.3 – Teacher Impact on Student Achievement 
Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t
Lagged proficiency 0.570 0.000 0.569 0.000 0.550 0.000 0.550 0.000
Year 2009 dummy -0.115 0.165 -0.149 0.084 0.353 0.000 0.325 0.001
Age 0.001 0.957 0.001 0.939 0.008 0.574 0.008 0.576
Father's education 0.031 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.027 0.000
Female 0.087 0.000 0.086 0.000 -0.025 0.186 -0.027 0.159
White 0.048 0.005 0.045 0.009 0.050 0.012 0.050 0.011
Class size 0.009 0.114 0.010 0.083 -0.011 0.091 -0.009 0.168
Peer's gender 0.139 0.469 0.228 0.300
Peer's race 0.424 0.038 -0.055 0.814
σj 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.42
Variance 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.17
Portuguese Mathematics
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
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Table 3.4 – Teacher Impact on Low and High Ability Students 
Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t
Lagged proficiency 0.265 0.000 0.599 0.000 0.644 0.000 0.194 0.000 0.662 0.000 0.426 0.000
Year dummy -0.562 0.001 -0.027 0.828 0.084 0.740 0.087 0.673 0.226 0.133 0.409 0.094
Age 0.029 0.214 0.012 0.546 -0.036 0.176 -0.023 0.492 0.035 0.128 0.024 0.422
Father's education 0.017 0.037 0.021 0.001 0.031 0.001 0.020 0.064 0.024 0.001 0.029 0.006
Female 0.067 0.041 0.057 0.017 0.089 0.022 0.007 0.865 -0.045 0.102 0.046 0.282
White 0.009 0.798 0.078 0.002 -0.003 0.947 0.002 0.954 0.049 0.086 0.012 0.788
Class size 0.030 0.034 0.007 0.415 0.006 0.658 0.013 0.480 -0.006 0.579 -0.015 0.283
Peer's gender 1.454 0.005 -0.367 0.146 0.463 0.382 0.079 0.876 -0.042 0.900 0.804 0.150
Peer's race -0.489 0.441 0.334 0.235 0.887 0.070 -0.940 0.112 0.071 0.846 -0.140 0.779
σj 0.61 0.48 0.57 0.60 0.51 0.73
Variance 0.37 0.23 0.33 0.36 0.26 0.53
Portuguese Mathematics
Low Achievement High Achievement Low Achievement High AchievementMedium Achievement Medium Achievement
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Table 3.5 – Teacher Impact on Different Students inside the Classroom 
Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t
Lagged proficiency 0.443 0.000 0.627 0.000 0.709 0.000 0.492 0.000
Year dummy -0.179 0.264 -0.482 0.005 -0.232 0.164 0.280 0.161
Age 0.009 0.748 0.037 0.225 -0.013 0.667 -0.011 0.704
Father's education 0.029 0.002 0.012 0.222 0.033 0.000 0.023 0.036
Female 0.060 0.107 0.063 0.094 0.039 0.285 0.084 0.054
White 0.023 0.550 0.129 0.001 0.026 0.484 0.003 0.948
Class size -0.003 0.784 0.020 0.072 0.018 0.095 0.008 0.575
Peer's gender 0.476 0.172 0.043 0.912 0.392 0.280 -0.429 0.370
Peer's race -0.200 0.582 0.602 0.128 0.564 0.167 0.680 0.222
σj 0.509 0.515 0.516 0.658
Variance 0.259 0.265 0.266 0.434
Chow's Test* 1.36 0.86 0.90 1.34
Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t
Lagged proficiency 0.439 0.000 0.669 0.000 0.648 0.000 0.343 0.000
Year dummy 0.424 0.023 0.089 0.663 0.262 0.174 0.400 0.088
Age -0.040 0.240 -0.029 0.456 0.041 0.244 -0.002 0.947
Father's education 0.035 0.001 0.009 0.414 0.032 0.002 0.032 0.018
Female 0.044 0.263 -0.020 0.649 -0.066 0.120 -0.073 0.167
White -0.001 0.979 0.073 0.126 0.076 0.080 0.039 0.448
Class size -0.020 0.091 0.001 0.920 0.001 0.950 -0.008 0.633
Peer's gender 0.298 0.401 0.111 0.813 0.635 0.136 -0.071 0.911
Peer's race -0.388 0.311 -0.304 0.543 -0.021 0.964 1.107 0.072
σj 0.543 0.582 0.576 0.779
Variance 0.295 0.339 0.332 0.607
Chow's Test* 1.34 0.92 1.02 1.50
* Chow´s test compares the parameters of the especific category of students with the rest of the students in the sample
Portuguese
Mathematics
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Chapter 1 
Table 1.A1 – Probability to “quit doing some activity for health reasons” - Females 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
female block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 block 5
formal workers -0.00215 -0.105 -0.019 -0.0016 -0.0148 -0.0322
(-0.11) (-1.18) (-0.54) (-0.04) (-0.30) (-0.39)   
good health 0.284 0.418 0.373 0.304 0.19 0.263
(8.81)*** (2.87)** (5.36)*** (4.74)*** (3.04)** (3.52)***
regular health 1.012 1.157 1.092 1.059 0.876 1.028
(30.67)*** (8.09)*** (15.77)*** (16.04)*** (12.70)*** (11.42)***
poor health 1.721 1.748 1.844 1.892 1.482 1.859
(34.50)*** (11.02)*** (20.55)*** (17.43)*** (10.06)*** (6.88)***
really poor health 1.887 2.007 1.872 2.066 1.863 2.278
(20.25)*** (8.95)*** (12.70)*** (9.53)*** (5.49)*** (5.62)***
_cons -2.011 -2.173 -2.076 -2.065 -1.852 -1.996
(-64.90)*** (-15.68)*** (-31.50)*** (-33.76)*** (-28.78)*** (-21.35)***
N 44818 5193 14075 11697 8019 5821
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table 1.A2 – Probability to “quit doing some activity for health reasons” - Males 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
males block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 block 5
formal workers 0.0248 0.0263 -0.013 0.0417 0.0528 0.0252
-1.34 -0.32 (-0.31) -1.17 -1.36 -0.34
good health 0.279 0.408 0.31 0.234 0.267 0.311
(9.38)*** (2.85)** (4.17)*** (4.03)*** (5.24)*** (4.47)***
regular health 1.032 1.144 1.099 0.99 0.989 1.03
(33.43)*** (8.07)*** (14.76)*** (16.61)*** (17.95)*** (12.78)***
poor health 1.693 1.746 1.672 1.735 1.743 1.653
(35.77)*** (10.90)*** (17.02)*** (18.93)*** (16.64)*** (9.41)***
really poor health 1.851 1.994 1.868 1.774 1.89 1.862
(18.95)*** (7.24)*** (10.66)*** (8.99)*** (9.20)*** (4.09)***
_cons -2.185 -2.268 -2.209 -2.179 -2.18 -2.206
(-75.48)*** (-16.76)*** (-31.75)*** (-39.25)*** (-40.71)*** (-25.13)***
N 62160 4883 13461 16908 18124 8770
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table 1.A3 – Probability to be “on leave” and “quit doing some activity for health 
reasons” - Females 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
females block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 block 5
formal workers 0.551 0.250 0.500 0.534 0.394 0.628
(11.11)*** -1.010 (6.27)*** (5.47)*** (2.99)** -1.930
good health 0.235 3.273 0.411 0.182 0.076 0.323
(2.76)** (13.06)*** -1.850 -1.050 -0.540 -1.600
regular health 0.807 3.398 0.848 0.941 0.668 1.028
(9.51)*** (13.38)*** (3.84)*** (5.63)*** (4.64)*** (4.83)***
poor health 1.471 4.035 1.584 1.720 1.194 1.852
(14.17)*** (.) (6.69)*** (8.47)*** (4.98)*** (4.87)***
really poor health 1.817 4.472 1.818 1.977 1.180 2.981
(12.31)*** (11.76)*** (6.30)*** (6.28)*** (2.25)* (6.78)***
_cons -3.305 -6.264 -3.354 -3.316 -2.981 -3.552
(-37.88)*** (-30.94)*** (-15.34)*** (-19.17)*** (-18.23)*** (-9.73)***
N 44820 5193 14076 11697 8020 5821
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table 1.A4 – Probability to be “on leave” and “quit doing some activity for health 
reasons” - Males 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
male block 1 block 2 block 3 block 4 block 5
formal workers 0.618 0.516 0.594 0.813 0.575 0.490
(12.38)*** (3.46)*** (6.10)*** (7.41)*** (4.94)*** (2.21)*  
good health 0.279 3.852 0.153 0.190 0.254 0.331
(3.48)*** (21.00)*** -0.660 -1.310 -1.930 -1.710
regular health 0.960 4.132 0.939 0.798 0.930 1.212
(12.00)*** (22.02)*** (4.23)*** (5.50)*** (7.01)*** (6.26)***
poor health 1.757 4.841 1.600 1.685 1.907 1.909
(18.53)*** (.) (6.60)*** (9.63)*** (11.27)*** (6.95)***
really poor health 1.820 0.971 1.957 2.212 2.379
(11.69)*** (2.07)* (6.64)*** (8.53)*** (4.65)***
_cons -3.515 -6.654 -3.432 -3.568 -3.477 -3.544
(-41.11)*** (-43.94)*** (-15.50)*** (-21.76)*** (-21.65)*** (-12.84)***
N 62164 4856 13461 16908 18126 8771
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Appendix Chapter 2 
Table 2.A1 – Two-stage least squares estimates 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Child Labor
Girls and Boys
Log Family Income -0.0275 0.0297 0.0808 0.0551 -0.0754 0.0734
(-0.68) -0.38 -0.87 -0.62 (-0.68) -0.60
F-test first stage 29.541 9.209 5.881 7.308 3.365 2.661
Girls
Log Family Income -0.0402 0.0338 0.164 -0.0947 -0.0395 0.143
(-0.73) -0.32 -0.95 (-0.83) (-0.29) -1.16
F-test first stage 13.136 5.186 2.108 3.267 1.860 2.619
Boys
Log Family Income -0.0231 0.00441 0.0308 0.084 -0.107 0.189
(-0.41) -0.04 -0.30 -0.82 (-0.71) -0.93
F-test first stage 17.231 5.148 5.143 6.124 2.139 1.203
Literacy
Girls and Boys
Log Family Income 0.0335 0.0623 -0.045 0.0732 0.0461 -0.0433
-1.15 -1.23 (-0.62) -1.03 -0.55 (-0.63)   
F-test first stage 50.149 20.039 9.513 10.242 5.204 4.101
Girls
Log Family Income 0.025 0.0677 -0.147 0.0442 -0.00763 -0.0402
-0.6 -0.98 (-1.01) -0.52 (-0.07) (-0.56)   
F-test first stage 24.341 11.328 2.584 5.928 2.697 3.729
Boys
Log Family Income 0.0368 0.0418 -0.0146 0.162 0.111 0.0221
-0.93 -0.62 (-0.19) -1.78 -1.00 -0.18
F-test first stage 27.291 10.357 7.841 6.568 2.984 1.489
Attendance
Girls and Boys
Log Family Income 0.0973** 0.168** 0.119 0.0683 0.229* -0.063
-3.15 -2.92 -1.62 -0.90 -2.35 (-0.78)   
F-test first stage 50.180 19.941 9.535 10.286 5.204 4.111
Girls
Log Family Income 0.151*** 0.228** 0.276 0.0324 0.242 -0.0262
-3.40 -2.94 -1.92 -0.35 -1.82 (-0.31)   
F-test first stage 24.335 11.298 2.576 5.923 2.697 3.729
Boys
Log Family Income 0.0413 0.0915 0.0151 -0.0489 0.195 -0.0727
-0.98 -1.17 -0.18 (-0.49) -1.50 (-0.56)   
F-test first stage 27.337 10.357 7.876 6.638 2.984 1.495
All Sample Socioeconomic Index Quintile
 
Instrumented:  log family income 
Instruments:   post age_head educ_head gender_head age age2 white female age_oldest educ_oldest family size, number of children in 
the family, jkT  and 
j
kT *post 
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Table 2.A2 – Testing Control Group 
child_labor literacy attendance   
False Female Treatment -0.00231 -0.0224 0.053
-0.0167 -0.0132 (0.0139)***
False Male Treatment -0.0331 0.0289 0.0339
-0.0176 (0.0138)* (0.0146)*  
Pre-control Female 0.0208 -0.0303 0.0272
-0.0148 (0.0113)** (0.0121)*  
Pre-control Male -0.0135 0.0239 0.0624
-0.0145 (0.0111)* (0.0119)***
post 0.0914 0.0162 0.0859
(0.0240)*** -0.0179 (0.0189)***
False Female Treatment x Post 0.00749 0.0275 -0.0357
-0.0249 -0.0189 -0.0198
False Male Treatment x Post 0.0225 -0.0186 -0.0302
-0.0248 -0.0189 -0.0198
Pre-control Female x Post -0.0143 0.0424 -0.0135
-0.0225 (0.0166)* -0.0175
Pre-control Male x Post -0.00752 0.00988 -0.0341
-0.0213 -0.0159 (0.0167)*  
N 13808 21158 21160
Prob > F child_labor literacy attendance   
Female
False Treatment - Pre-control 0.295 0.352 0.190
Male
False Treatment - Pre-control 0.193 0.096 0.833
Difference β4 - β5
Female
False Treatment - Pre-control 0.0218 -0.0149 -0.0222
Male
False Treatment - Pre-control 0.0300 -0.0285 0.0039
standar errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table 2.A3 – Testing Female Bargaining Power 
coef. robust std.err P > t coef. robust std.err P > t
Child Labor
Female Treatment old rule x Post 0.035 0.025 0.158 -0.102 0.054 0.058
Male Treatment old rule x Post -0.018 0.020 0.388 -0.147 0.152 0.332
Female Treatment new rule x Post -0.035 0.022 0.108 -0.075 0.053 0.155
Male Treatment new rule x Post -0.022 0.023 0.341 0.208 0.217 0.337
Literacy
Female Treatment old rule x Post -0.005 0.018 0.770 0.050 0.042 0.236
Male Treatment old rule x Post 0.038 0.015 0.013 -0.038 0.141 0.787
Female Treatment new rule x Post 0.012 0.017 0.473 0.050 0.041 0.224
Male Treatment new rule x Post 0.059 0.018 0.001 0.057 0.183 0.756
Attendance
Female Treatment old rule x Post 0.003 0.019 0.865 0.140 0.043 0.001
Male Treatment old rule x Post 0.050 0.016 0.002 -0.271 0.096 0.005
Female Treatment new rule x Post -0.020 0.018 0.276 0.095 0.043 0.026
Male Treatment new rule x Post 0.053 0.019 0.005 0.270 0.161 0.093
Girls
Child Labor
Female Treatment old rule x Post 0.000 0.032 0.998 -0.028 0.072 0.700
Male Treatment old rule x Post 0.012 0.027 0.657 -0.074 0.198 0.707
Female Treatment new rule x Post -0.033 0.028 0.242 -0.059 0.073 0.418
Male Treatment new rule x Post -0.011 0.030 0.703 0.483 0.279 0.084
Literacy
Female Treatment old rule x Post 0.006 0.024 0.815 0.058 0.058 0.313
Male Treatment old rule x Post 0.033 0.021 0.126 -0.141 0.194 0.466
Female Treatment new rule x Post -0.005 0.023 0.824 0.111 0.059 0.057
Male Treatment new rule x Post 0.069 0.025 0.005 0.115 0.255 0.653
Attendance
Female Treatment old rule x Post 0.039 0.026 0.132 0.203 0.060 0.001
Male Treatment old rule x Post 0.061 0.023 0.008 -0.261 0.105 0.013
Female Treatment new rule x Post -0.009 0.025 0.709 0.116 0.059 0.051
Male Treatment new rule x Post 0.044 0.027 0.100 0.374 0.199 0.061
Boys
Child Labor
Female Treatment old rule x Post 0.072 0.037 0.052 -0.185 0.081 0.023
Male Treatment old rule x Post -0.043 0.031 0.157 -0.220 0.237 0.354
Female Treatment new rule x Post -0.041 0.033 0.212 -0.083 0.077 0.282
Male Treatment new rule x Post -0.032 0.034 0.351 -0.115 0.295 0.695
Literacy
Female Treatment old rule x Post -0.016 0.026 0.525 0.055 0.061 0.372
Male Treatment old rule x Post 0.041 0.022 0.055 0.038 0.197 0.846
Female Treatment new rule x Post 0.030 0.024 0.211 0.003 0.059 0.963
Male Treatment new rule x Post 0.051 0.025 0.042 -0.028 0.279 0.921
Attendance
Female Treatment old rule x Post -0.032 0.027 0.241 0.087 0.062 0.158
Male Treatment old rule x Post 0.041 0.023 0.076 -0.352 0.167 0.036
Female Treatment new rule x Post -0.026 0.026 0.302 0.085 0.061 0.161
Male Treatment new rule x Post 0.062 0.027 0.019 0.108 0.215 0.617
Children living with Male Household Heads Children living with Female Household Heads
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Figure 2.A1 – Average Family Income 
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